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ARTICLES
THE BOUNDARIES OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT RULE AND RELATED LEGAL
DOCTRINES
Alan 0. Sykes*
441TICARIOUS liability" may be defined as the imposition of lia-
V bility upon one party for a wrong committed by another party.1
One of its most common forms is the imposition of liability on an
employer for the wrong of an employee or agent.
The imposition of vicarious liability usually depends in part upon
the nature of the activity in which the wrong arises. For example, if
an employee (or "servant") commits a tort within the ordinary course
of business, the employer (or "master") normally incurs vicarious lia-
bility under principles of respondeat superior. If the tort arises outside
the "scope of employment," however, the employer does not incur
liability, absent special circumstances. 2 Roughly speaking, this "scope
of employment rule" restricts vicarious liability to tortious conduct
that "should be considered as one of the normal risks to be borne by
the business,"3 thereby excluding an employee's "personal" torts.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.' I have received helpful
comments on prior drafts of this Article from Albert Alschuler, Richard Epstein, David Haddock,
Fred McChesney, Richard Posner, Stephen Schulhofer, and Steven Shavell, and from the
participants in the Law and Economics Workshop of the University of Chicago. I also wish to
thank the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, which provided financial support for this
research.
I Vicarious liability has received increasing academic attention in recent years, much of it
from the economic perspective. See, e.g., Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice
Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1345 (1982);
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. EcoN.
& ORG. 53 (1986); Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic
Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980); Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control
of Corporate Conduct, go YALE L.J. I (i98o); Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93
YALE L.J. 1231 (1984).
2 See infra Part II.
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 comment a (1958).
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This Article provides an economic analysis of the "scope of em-
ployment" rule and related legal doctrines that have evolved to limit
vicarious liability in various contexts. Part I develops the theoretical
framework by interweaving the economic theory of incentive contract-
ing in principal-agent relationships with the economic interpretation
of causation requirements in tort law. Part II applies this framework
to a discussion of the two types of tort cases in which the scope of
employment is most frequently litigated: "frolic and detour" cases and
intentional tort cases. The objective of the analysis is to determine
whether the existing disposition of cases tends to promote economic
welfare, and, when it does not, to suggest how the law might be
modified to that end. Part II also addresses the limited duty of an
employer to control employees' conduct that falls outside the scope of
their employment and the related line of "negligent hiring" cases. Part
II concludes that existing tort doctrine is often consistent with the
pursuit of economic welfare but that the law sometimes focuses on
factors that are irrelevant to this goal. Accordingly, Part II suggests
a number of modifications to existing legal rules.
Part III adapts the theoretical framework developed in Part I to
analyze the liability of a motor vehicle owner for the tort of someone
who borrows the vehicle, the liability of a premises owner for the tort
of an intruder, and the liability of an employer for the sexual harass-
ment of one employee by another. Like Part II, Part III concludes
that the approach of current law to these issues is often reasonably
efficient but that several aspects of existing doctrine should be modi-
fied.
I. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
The analysis throughout this Article contemplates the choice be-
tween a rule of personal liability, under which the employee alone is
liable for his wrongs,4 and a rule of vicarious liability, under which
the employer and employee are jointly and severally liable. The
objective of the analysis is to identify the circumstances under which
each rule is "efficient" - that is, the circumstances under which each
rule best promotes economic welfare. The concept of economic wel-
fare that underlies the analysis is by now familiar: liability rule A will
be said to be "efficient" relative to liability rule B if rule A is poten-
tially Pareto superior to rule B from the perspective of society as a
whole.5
4 The use of masculine pronouns throughout is for convenience only and is not intended to
convey any assumption about gender identity.
5 This measure of economic welfare is sometimes known as the "potential compensation test,"
which serves as the basis for much of the modern literature on applied welfare economics and
cost-benefit analysis. Conceptually, the test inquires whether those who benefit from a change
[Vol. 101:563
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A. The Efficiency of Vicarious Liability
for Employment-Related Wrongs
In most cases in which an employee commits a tort during the
ordinary course of duties, no question arises as to whether the em-
ployee acted within the scope of employment. The wrongful conduct
is plainly a consequence of the employment relationship and represents
the materialization of a risk that is normally attendant upon such
employment relationships.
The efficiency of imposing vicarious liability on the employer under
these conditions has been studied at some length. In a previous
article, 6 I analyzed the choice between personal liability and vicarious
liability for torts clearly within the scope of employment and devel-
oped several principles for assessing which rule best promotes eco-
nomic welfare. Because these principles also bear upon the efficiency
of vicarious liability in cases in which the scope of employment is in
question, it is useful to summarize them here. 7
i. The Significance of the Choice Between Personal Liability and
Vicarious Liability. - Economic theory suggests that between any
employer and employee there exists an optimal allocation of the risk
of financial loss attendant upon any judgment against the employee.
This allocation must take into account each party's attitude toward
risk-bearing, the employee's incentives to avoid whatever conduct
might lead to a judgment against him, and the incentives available
to the employer to monitor the employee or otherwise to guard against
the occurrence of a wrong.
If the assumption of liability by the employer is efficient from the
perspective of the employer and the employee, and the employer
agrees to bear all or part of the risk of a particular judgment, that
agreement represents part of the employee's total compensation pack-
age, and other components of total compensation are reduced com-
mensurately. In general, the employer will agree to bear all or part
of the risk of a judgment if and only if the expected cost to him of
doing so (including perhaps a risk premium if the employer is risk
averse) is less than the reduction in the other components of the
in policy can compensate those who suffer and still remain better off themselves. Thus, any
change in policy that satisfies the test is potentially Pareto superior - if compensation is actually
paid to those who suffer, no one will be worse off than before and some will be better off. See
H. VARIAN, MICROECONomiC ANALYSIS 218 (ist ed. 1978). All technical problems with the
measure, such as its possible circularity in exceptional cases due to wealth effects, are assumed
away. The use of the potential compensation test is now quite routine in economic studies of
tort law. See, e.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW I6-
17 (987).
6 See Sykes, supra note I.
7 For a complete exposition of these results, see id. at 1233-59.
1988]
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employee's compensation package that the employee will accept in
exchange for the employer's promise.
Absent transaction costs for private risk-allocation agreements, the
optimal allocation of risk does not depend upon where the law initially
places liability. If the employer would bear the risk in an optimal
agreement but a rule of personal liability prevails, then the employer
and the employee will contract voluntarily for the employer to reim-
burse the employee in the event of a judgment. On the other hand,
if the employee would bear the risk in an optimal agreement but a
rule of vicarious liability prevails, then the employee will contract to
reimburse the employer for any amount that the employer pays to a
successful plaintiff.
In short, regardless of who bears liability initially, private con-
tracting between the employer and the employee can ensure that the
ultimate liability of each party accords with the optimal allocation of
risk. Such analysis suggests that the choice between a rule of personal
or vicarious liability may be unimportant.8
This conclusion rests, however, upon two critical assumptions.
First, it assumes that the sum of the payments to the plaintiff by the
employer and the employee is the same under both rules of liability.
If the plaintiff's judgment exceeds the employee's assets, however, as
may often be the case, then the plaintiff will collect more under
vicarious liability. Private contracting cannot achieve the same allo-
cation of risk under either liability rule in these circumstances because
the magnitude of the risk to be allocated changes with the liability
rule. Either the employee, the employer, or both the employer and
employee must pay more under vicarious liability.
Second, as suggested at the outset, the proposition that the choice
of liability rule does not affect the ultimate incidence of liability
depends upon an assumption that the transaction costs of negotiating
and enforcing a private risk-allocation contract are small enough to
permit the employer and the employee profitably to enter into such a
contract. In fact, the costs of risk-allocation agreements may be con-
siderable, and a reallocation of liability by contract thus may be
infeasible or at least quite costly.
Hence, the choice between vicarious liability and personal liability
is a significant one whenever the employee is unable to pay judgments
in full under a rule of personal liability or the costs of negotiating and
enforcing a private risk-allocation contract between the employer and
the employee are significant. Both circumstances arise frequently in
practice and, as suggested below, both lead to significant inefficiencies
under personal liability that vicarious liability sometimes will elimi-
nate.
8 This proposition is also developed in some detail in Kornhauser, supra note i, at 1347,
1357-61.
[Vol. ioi:563
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2. The Potential Inefficiencies of Personal Liability. - Assume
for the moment that the employee's tort is not related to any voluntary
business transaction with the employer's business (thus, for example,
the victim is not a customer or a fellow employee). This assumption
ensures that the probability of a tort will not affect consumer willing-
ness to pay for the goods and services of the enterprise and will not
affect the wage demands of fellow employees. I will relax this as-
sumption below as required.
The possibility that employees may be unable to pay judgments
against them in full creates three possible inefficiencies under a rule
of personal liability. First, because the employee does not bear the
full (expected) cost of his wrongs, his incentive to avoid committing
a wrong, either accidentally or intentionally, often (though not
always 9) will be inefficiently small. As a result, the incidence of
wrongdoing increases to an inefficiently high level.
Second, because the employer's business does not bear the full cost
of the compensable wrongs attendant upon its operation' ° (either di-
rectly through liability payments or indirectly through wages paid to
employees who make liability payments"), its profitability is inflated
relative to what it would be if the employee could pay judgments in
full. In a competitive market, the employer is then likely to expand
production beyond the socially optimal level because his private mar-
ginal costs of production are lower than the social marginal costs of
production. 12
9 Conceivably, even if an employee cannot pay judgments in full, the prospect of a judgment
that would exhaust his assets might motivate an inefficiently high level of care. Specifically, a
highly risk-averse employee may exercise great care to avoid bankruptcy and might exercise
more care than would be cost effective if, for example, all liability were efficiently allocated to
a risk-neutral employer.
10 As Coase recognized long ago, however, injuries are also a cost of victims' activities. See
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. i (i96o). This fact and its implications for
the choice between personal and vicarious liability are discussed at length at pp. 579-81 below.
11 This problem does not arise if employees can pay judgments in full, because employees
will then bear the full costs of compensable wrongs either directly or indirectly. Obviously,
employers do not pay judgments directly under a rule of personal liability unless they agree to
"insure" their employees against liability. If an employer does not provide such "insurance,"
however, employees will take that fact into account in choosing among alternative employment
opportunities. Employees will then require higher wages to accept positions that require them
to bear a greater risk of liability, and employers will bear costs of liability indirectly through
wage payments. If employees can pay all judgments against them in full, their wage demands
will reflect the full expected value of prospective liability judgments. Business enterprises will
then fully internalize the expected costs of liability through wage payments even if liability
judgments are fully paid by employees and transaction costs preclude express bargaining between
employers and employees over the allocation of the risk of judgments against the employees.
12 The social marginal costs of production include all marginal costs to the enterprise -
labor, materials, liability judgments paid, and so on - plus the marginal costs of wrongs to
injured parties that are properly attributable to the business enterprise but that go uncompen-
1988]
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Third, when employees are potentially insolvent, they may be
dissuaded from entering optimal risk-allocation agreements with their
employers. An effective risk-sharing agreement requires the employer
and the employee to pay the full value of the judgment against the
employee, which clearly reduces their expected wealth relative to a
regime in which part of the judgment goes unsatisfied. 13 The existence
of this added "cost" to risk-sharing may dissuade risk-sharing - in-
deed, it may motivate employers to seek out insolvent employees to
bear the risk of dangerous activities - despite the fact that the
employer is often the better risk bearer. 14
In addition to these three inefficiencies, inefficiencies may arise
under a rule of personal liability even when employees are able to
pay all judgments in full if there are significant costs to employers
and employees in negotiating and enforcing risk-allocation agreements.
Specifically, if the employer is the better risk bearer, such costs may
prevent the employer from assuming the risk of judgments against the
sated. Part I.B. below considers the issue of which costs are "properly attributable" to the
enterprise. See infra pp. 571-79.
13 Suppose, for example, that the employer is risk neutral and the employee is risk averse.
Suppose further that the probability of the tort is o. i and that this probability cannot be reduced
through precautionary measures by the employee - there is no moral hazard problem if the
employer assumes the risk of liability. If the employee could pay all judgments in full, optimal
risk-sharing would then require the employer to assume the risk of liability in its entirety to
shield the risk-averse employee from any prospect of an adverse judgment. The employer would
be compensated by the opportunity to reduce wages by an amount greater than or equal to the
actuarial value of the risk that he assumes.
Suppose, however, that the potential liability of the employee is $i million and that the
employee has only $io,ooo in assets. To provide the risk-averse employee with protection
against loss of his assets in the event of an adverse judgment, the employer must agree to pay
not $xo,ooo, but $i million. The first $99o,ooo assuredly will go to the plaintiff, and only
amounts in excess of that will provide the employee with protection from the prospect of
insolvency. In effect, if the employer is to offer insurance to the risk-averse employee, he must
also offer insurance to the plaintiff. (This discussion properly assumes that the employee cannot
obtain a discharge in bankruptcy and then collect an insurance payment from the employer -
the prospective payment from the employer would be treated as an asset by the bankruptcy
court and could not be withheld from the plaintiff). Yet only the employee can compensate the
employer for insurance through a wage reduction, and the amount of compensation that he will
offer may be far short of that necessary to justify the insurance.
In this example, the expected payment from the employer to the plaintiff under an insurance
arrangement to protect the employee against the loss of his $xo,ooo would equal (o.x) x $x
million = $ioo,ooo. Hence, the employer could only come out ahead if wages fell by more
than $xoo,ooo, but that amount probably exceeds the total wages of the employee and far
exceeds anything that he would be willing to pay for $xo,ooo worth of insurance.
14 Other things being equal, the employer is likely to be the better risk bearer if he can more
readily insure against the risk of liability; if he can diversify the risk by virtue of a large pool
of employees who each present similar risks; or if he is a corporation as to which the risk of
judgments against employees is a diversifiable risk for the stockholders. The employer may also
be a better risk bearer simply because the employer is wealthier than the employee and thus
may be less averse to risks of a given magnitude.
IVol. 101:563
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employee that exist under personal liability. Alternatively, the em-
ployer and the employee will have to incur the costs of an agreement
to shift the risk of liability to the employer.
3. The Effects of Vicarious Liability. - Vicarious liability reduces
or eliminates some of the inefficiencies that can arise under personal
liability. ' 5 First, because vicarious liability, ensures that any judgment
against the employee will be paid to the limit of the combined assets
of the employer and the employee, any inefficient expansion of the
scale of business activity that results when the employee cannot pay
judgments is avoided, or at least lessened. Second, vicarious liability
often will improve the efficiency of risk-sharing by eliminating the
incentive that may exist under personal liabilty to leave liability on
the employee in order to take advantage of his inability to pay judg-
ments. Moreover, if the employer is the better risk bearer, vicarious
liability can eliminate transaction costs that the employer and the
employee might otherwise incur in negotiating and enforcing a private
agreement under which the employer assumes the risk of liability.
The ultimate efficiency or inefficiency of vicarious liability also
depends, however, on its effect upon employees' incentives to avoid
wrongful conduct. The effect of vicarious liability on such incentives
depends in turn upon the devices available to the employer to induce
careful behavior and the costs of those devices.
One such device is direct observation of the employee's activities.
If the employer can cheaply observe precautionary behavior (or delib-
erately tortious behavior) by each employee, the employer can simply
announce a desired standard of conduct, observe subsequent employee
behavior, and penalize employees who fail to meet the desired stan-
dard. 16 This type of incentive system is usually inexpensive to design
15 As noted above, this discussion is limited to wrongs against parties outside the employment
relation whose injury is not related to any voluntary business transaction with the employer's
business. The analysis can easily be extended to other types of injuries, such as injuries to
customers or fellow employees. See Sykes, supra note i, at 1256-59.
For example, suppose that employees occasionally commit torts against customers of their
employers. If customers are fully informed ex ante about the probability of a tort and the
prospects of compensation at each business and take that information fully into account in their
purchase decisions, then their willingness to pay for the goods and services of each business will
adjust perfectly to reflect the prospect of an uncompensated injury. Businesses will then be
unable to externalize liability by employing judgment-proof agents. The efficiency of vicarious
liability will therefore depend primarily upon whether it improves risk allocation between the
employer and the employee in the presence of transaction costs. See id. at 1258.
By contrast, if customers have no information about the risk of torts associated with their
voluntary business transactions, their willingness to pay will not reflect risks of uncompensated
injury. The existence of the customer relationship is of no signficance to the analysis of vicarious
liability in such cases. See id. at 1257.
Various intermediate cases of "imperfect information" may also be postulated. For analysis
of the information conditions in particular settings and their implications, see Parts III.B. and
III.C. below.
16 For example, suppose that injuries at a construction project can be easily avoided by the
1988]
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and to implement (assuming that observation is inexpensive) and often
provides the employer with the ability to avert employee misconduct
altogether.
The employer's influence over advancement and compensation de-
cisions often provides another important incentive device. If the em-
ployee desires a long-term relationship with the employer, the em-
ployer can exploit this desire through policies under which the
employee's prospects for advancement and pay raises, and even the
employee's continued employment, depend in part upon the employee's
avoidance of any misconduct that might result in harm. Such incen-
tives are also fairly inexpensive to implement in many cases 17 and, as
long as the employee values the employment relationship, these incen-
tives can act as an effective constraint on the employee's behavior
even if the employer cannot cheaply observe that behavior. Moreover,
because these incentives affect the employee's current and future
stream of earnings, they may motivate the employee to avoid wrongful
conduct better than the prospect of a liability judgment, which will
only be paid to the limit of the employee's current assets (if the
judgment is dischargeable in bankruptcy).
The ability of the employer to affect the employee's incentives is
much more limited, however, when the employee's behavior is not
easily observed or when the employee has no interest in maintaining
a long-term employment relationship. Under these conditions, per-
haps the only device available to dissuade misconduct is the threat of
an indemnity action against the employee in the event that the em-
ployer incurs vicarious liability. Such actions can be quite costly to
pursue, however, and may not be cost effective if the employee's assets
are modest.' 8 When the threat of an indemnity action is the only
device for the maintenance of incentives, therefore, a rule of vicarious
liability actually may reduce employees' incentives to avoid wrongful
conduct and reduce economic welfare. 19
erection of a barricade to shield an excavation. Knowing the need for such a precaution, the
employer can simply order employees to erect it and observe whether or not they comply. Such
an observation will usually require little expenditure of time or effort by the employer.
17 See Sykes, supra note i, at 1253-55.
18 The limited empirical evidence suggests that the employer's right to indemnity is rarely
exercised. See Sykes, supra note i, at 1243. Whether this may reflect an optimal assumption
of risk by employers or the costs of indemnity actions is difficult to determine.
19 If an employee's assets are too meager to justify the pursuit of indemnity by the employer
under vicarious liability, then a prospective plaintiff may also find it unprofitable to bring suit
under personal liability. If so, then the imposition of vicarious liability will not dilute the
employee's incentives to avoid wrongdoing. Plaintiffs may find it worthwhile to file suit,
however, even if the employer does not. Unlike the employer, the plaintiff may have an
emotional or dignitary interest in filing an action. Alternatively, the employer may decline to
pursue indemnity in order to avoid the disruption of otherwise amicable relations with the
workforce - an indemnity action that sends an employee into personal bankruptcy could send
[Vol. ioi:563
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B. The Causal Relation Between Business Activity
and Employee Wrongs
The analysis to this point has assumed that the wrong committed
by the employee is properly viewed as a cost of the employer's busi-
ness. For example, the proposition that the evasion of liability judg-
ments by an insolvent agent may lead to an inefficient expansion in
the scale of business activity clearly rests on this assumption or, to
put it slightly differently, on an assumption that the business is the
"cause" of the wrongs that lead to the judgments. These notions
warrant further elaboration.
r. A Definition of "Enterprise Causation." - The legal meaning
of the term "cause" depends upon context. In tort law, for example,
one often distinguishes "cause in fact" from "proximate cause" and
other forms of "causation, ' 20 and a variety of definitions exist for each
concept. 21
This Section introduces a definition of causation that captures the
relationship between the existence of an employer's business and the
occurrence of a wrong by an employee. To distinguish this concept
of causation from similar concepts in the law and in the literature, it
will be termed "enterprise causation."
Initially, it is necessary to define the term "wrong" as it is used in
the analysis that follows:
Definition: A "wrong" is an injurious act that leads to liability of a
given magnitude.
For example, a particular act of negligence that a person commits
while driving a motor vehicle, resulting in a tort that creates liability
of $i million, might constitute a "wrong. '22
a signal to the workforce that the employer has little interest in the personal welfare of his
employees, affecting morale and productivity adversely.
Finally, even if an indemnity action is worthwhile for the employer, such actions are costly.
Also, vicarious liability adds an additional party to litigation and thus may increase litigation
costs significantly. Unless these costs are offset by some other benefit of vicarious liability, a
shift from personal liability to vicarious liability will reduce economic welfare.
20 See e.g., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 263-321 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
21 For a recent survey of the causal inquiry, see Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 1735 (1985).
22 Such a definition of "wrong" is to be distinguished from narrower definitions that, for
example, might distinguish among otherwise identical "wrongs" according to the identity of the
victim or to the time and place at which the wrong occurs, and from broader definitions that
might not, for example, distinguish among wrongs according to the magnitude of liability.
This definition is chosen because the analysis to follow focuses on the degree to which the
employment relation affects the expected social costs of torts. To capture those effects, it is
useful to consider the effect of the employment relation on the probability distribution of each
possible "wrong" as here defined.
1988]
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The remaining definitions capture the "causal" connection between
the existence of the employment relation and the occurrence of em-
ployees' wrongs. The crucial variable in this analysis is the extent to
which the employment relation increases the probability of each
wrong.
Definition: An enterprise "fully causes" the wrong of an employee if
the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent unemployment of the
employee would reduce the probability of the wrong to zero. 23
For example, consider the case of a service station attendant who
negligently performs improper repairs on a customer's vehicle, result-
ing in an accident and a judgment against the attendant. The accident
is fully caused by the service station enterprise under the above defi-
nition if the dissolution of the service station enterprise and the sub-
sequent unemployment of the attendant would reduce the probability
of an accident attributable to negligent repairs by the attendant to
zero.
By contrast, suppose that the same attendant occasionally commits
acts of wife-beating and that the incidence of such acts bears no
relation to the attendant's employment or unemployment. Then, the
tort of wife-beating is not caused by the service station enterprise,
because its dissolution and the employee's subsequent unemployment
would not reduce the probability of the tort.
To be sure, intermediate cases exist. The probability of wife-
beating, for example, might be increased by certain stressful occupa-
tions. Such cases motivate a further refinement of the definition of
enterprise causation.
Definition: An enterprise "partially causes" the wrong of an employee
if the dissolution of the enterprise and subsequent unemployment of
the employee would reduce the probability of the wrong but not
eliminate it.
One component of the definitions of both full and partial enterprise
causation is the "subsequent unemployment" of the employee after
dissolution of the enterprise. Thus, to assess enterprise causation in
the service station example above, one assumes that after the disso-
lution of the service station agency the attendant does not go to work
for another service station or open his own repair business.
23 This definition of causation is closely related to the concept of "probabilistic causation"
developed in Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 468-69 (I98o), and to the analysis of causation developed in Landes &
Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 1o9 (1983). Cal-
abresi was perhaps the first to suggest the economic signficance of probabilistic notions of
causation. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69
(1975).
[Vol. 101:563
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To be sure, if the service station agency were in fact to dissolve,
the employee might well move to a position with another employer.
The probability of wrongful behavior in that new position (whether
or not in the same line of business) might be less than, equal to, or
greater than the probability of wrongful behavior in the former posi-
tion. Nonetheless, the appropriate benchmark for the comparison of
probabilities in the analysis to follow is the subsequent unemployment
of the employee. That comparison is the appropriate one because, as
the economic discussion will indicate, the efficiency of resource allo-
cation is enhanced if each business enterprise bears the incremental
social costs associated with its operation. By measuring those incre-
mental costs with reference to the social costs that would otherwise
arise if the resources used by the enterprise were unemployed, a
resulting competitive equilibrium will tend to generate an efficient
allocation of resources among alternative enterprises and alternative
(nonenterprise) uses for the resources (such as leisure). 2 4 To be sure,
this proposition is subject to a number of caveats relating to the theory
of the second-best, many of which are linked to matters discussed
below (cost externalization due to insolvency, the infeasibility of cost
internalization by both injurers and victims, and so on).25
Note finally that the definitions of full and partial enterprise cau-
sation leave open the possibility that the dissolution of the enterprise
and subsequent unemployment of the employee may increase the prob-
ability that the former employee will commit some other wrong. 26
2. The Implications of Enterprise Causation. - (a) Passive Vic-
tims. - Assume initially that the victims of wrongs are "passive," in
the sense that they cannot or will not take cost-effective measures to
protect themselves against wrongs either by adopting precautions or
by curtailing activities that might expose them to potential wrong-
doers. 2 7 The importance of enterprise causation may now be illus-
24 To give a simple example that suggests why the "subsequent unemployment" benchmark
is appropriate, suppose that an individual will commit a wrong that causes $io,ooo worth of
harm with probability o.x if he is unemployed. If he is employed by either Sears or Wards,
the probability of the same wrong rises to 0.2. Thus, if the individual is hired by either
company, an incremental social cost of (0.2-0.1) X $1O,OOO = $I,ooo results from his activities
as an employee. If his employment is to be economically efficient, it must generate enough
value to cover this cost in addition to his wages and all other costs of hiring him. Yet if the
incremental costs of wrongs by workers at Sears were measured with reference to the probability
of wrongs by workers at Wards, one would conclude that these incremental costs were zero -
the probability of the wrong is the same at either company. And if, as a result, neither Sears
nor Wards were required to bear the $i,ooo incremental cost associated with hiring the worker,
both would tend to hire an inefficiently high number of employees and to expand to a point at
which the social marginal costs of their activities exceeded the social marginal benefits.
25 See infra pp. 579-81.
26 The implications of this possibility are explored in note 34 below.
27 This assumption is relaxed below. The analysis in this Section encompasses instances in
which victims cannot take measures to reduce their exposure to injury; instances in which it is
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trated with variations on the following hypothetical. An enterprise
produces a good that many consumers value well in excess of its
marginal capital, labor, and materials costs. The good is priced com-
petitively, thereby yielding substantial consumer (and perhaps pro-
ducer) surplus. Suppose, however, that some of the employees who
produce the good tend to commit assaults that result in civil liability.
By hypothesis, neither the probability that an employee will commit
an assault nor the magnitude of the resulting liability depends upon
the employee's wealth, upon whether he is employed or unemployed,
or upon any characteristic of his employment. In addition, by hy-
pothesis, no incentive mechanism exists that would enable the em-
ployer to reduce the incidence of employee assaults.
To hold the employer vicariously liable for such employee assaults,
regardless of when or where they occur or the identity of the assault
victim, is almost certainly inefficient. The employer cannot affect the
number of assaults or the total amount of damages. Thus, to the
extent that vicarious liability imposes additional costs on the enter-
prise, it may drive the enterprise out of business or at the very least
cause it to shrink as the marginal costs of production increase. Society
then will lose at least some of the economic surplus from the produc-
tion of the enterprise. 28
Employers might recoup some of their losses through indemnity
actions, and when they did not, the costs of vicarious liability to the
employer would be mitigated by a decline in the wages paid to em-
ployees - if an employer were forced to "insure" his employees against
liability for assaults that are unrelated to the enterprise, employees
would reduce their wage demands by the expected value to them of
the "insurance" provided by their employers. In a perfectly informed
labor market in which employees could pay all judgments against
them, and neglecting the effects of risk aversion, this reduction in
wage demands would result in a wage that was lower by precisely
the expected value of the liability borne by the employer. The mar-
ginal costs of production would be unaffected, and no loss of surplus
would arise.
This conclusion, however, assumes away the familiar problems of
employee insolvency and transaction costs. Employees who cannot
inefficient for victims to take such measures; and instances in which victims, because of "bounded
rationality" (for example, a failure to perceive the risk of injury or the opportunity to take
precautionary measures), systematically neglect the opportunity to reduce their exposure to
injury.
28 One caveat relates to the possibility that vicarious liability provides risk-sharing benefits
that are unattainable in its absence due to transaction costs. Although it seems highly improb-
able, because of the moral hazard problem, that an optimal risk-allocation agreement between
the employer and the employee would call for the employer to assume liability for the employee's
assaults, it is conceivable that employers are better risk bearers than assault victims. Vicarious
liability might then enhance the efficiency of risk-sharing when employees are judgment-proof.
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pay judgments in full may not value "insurance" provided by employ-
ers at its full expected cost to the employer. Their wage demands
thus will not fall by the full expected value of the "insurance," and a
decline in wages will not fully compensate the employer for increased
liability. In addition, as noted above, various transaction costs tend
to increase when employers are held vicariously liable, and these costs
will add to the marginal costs of production. Hence, the imposition
of vicarious liability under the circumstances hypothesized here ap-
pears inefficient because it leads to higher costs of production, higher
prices, and a loss of consumer and producer surplus, but in no way
reduces the expected costs of employee misconduct.
This analysis suggests the general proposition that vicarious lia-
bility for a given wrong is probably inefficient if (a) the enterprise
does not cause the wrong, even partially; and (b) the enterprise cannot
reduce the probability of the wrong through incentive contracts with
its employees. 29
A second proposition can be illustrated with a slight modification
of the above hypothetical. Continuing with the assumption that the
employer cannot reduce the incidence of assaults through incentive
devices, suppose that the employee is more likely to commit assaults
in the workplace than elsewhere, so that his employment increases
the probability that an assault will occur. The probability of a wrong
thus depends upon whether the employee is employed or not, but (by
hypothesis) cannot be affected by the employer once the employee has
been hired. An employee with an intrinsically stressful job may be
more likely to commit an assault, for example, but the employer's
only effective means of reducing the probability of an assault may be
to terminate the employment relationship.
In this situation, it is inefficient to impose vicarious liability on
the enterprise for the full value of the wrong, because the scale of the
enterprise's activity will tend to contract excessively. Yet it is also
inefficient to allow the enterprise to escape liability altogether - if
the employee is insolvent, the resulting scale of enterprise activity will
be excessive. Efficient resource allocation thus requires the enterprise
to bear liability for part, but not all, of the cost of the wrong.30 If
29 Previous writers have suggested similar propositions, but without considering the avail-
ability of effective incentive devices. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and
the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 514 (196i) (arguing that "resource allocation militates
strongly against allocating to an enterprise costs not closely associated with it"); Smith, Frolic
& Detour, 1923 COLUm. L. REv. 444, 461 (suggesting that an enterprise should bear risk only
if the enterprise is a contributing factor).
30 Although the computation of the appropriate judgment against the enterprise may be
complex (perhaps infeasible) in practice, it is conceptually straightforward - the value of the
judgment against the employer must ensure that the enterprise directly or indirectly bears a cost
of production with an expected value exactly equal to the increment in the expected value of
the wrong attributable to the enterprise.
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the imposition of partial liability is infeasible for institutional reasons
- if vicarious liability must be imposed on an all or nothing basis -
then the liability rule is inevitably "second-best." Other things being
equal, the greater the extent to which the employment relation
"causes" the wrong, the more likely it is that vicarious liability for the
entire judgment will be second-best efficient. 3 1
A third proposition may be illustrated with a further variation of
the assumptions above. Again suppose that the employer cannot re-
duce the incidence of assaults with incentive devices and that the
probability of an assault depends solely upon the employment or
unemployment of the employee. Assume further that the probability
of an assault would be zero if the employment relationship were
dissolved and the employee remained unemployed thereafter. Thus,
the enterprise fully causes the assault. It follows that the injury
attributable to the assault is a cost that is fully attributable to the
operation of the enterprise - the enterprise will operate at an efficient
level of output only if it bears, directly or indirectly, all liability for
the employee's assault. The imposition of vicarious liability is plainly
efficient under these circumstances because, by hypothesis, it can have
no adverse effect on the incentives of the employee to engage in
tortious conduct.
The analysis becomes more complex if incentive devices can reduce
the probability of the wrong or if the assumption of liability by the
employer may affect the propensity of the employee to commit the
assault. To continue with the previous hypothetical, suppose that the
probability of an assault is not directly affected by the employment
or unemployment of the employee - and thus the enterprise does not
even "partially cause" the assault - but that the employer can reduce
the probability of an assault through some appropriate incentive de-
vice, for example, by threatening to discharge the employee if he
commits an assault or by observing the employee's behavior in ad-
vance of an assault and intervening to prevent the assault before it
occurs. Obviously, the employer has no reason to use such an incen-
tive device under a rule of personal liability. The question thus arises
whether vicarious liability may enhance economic welfare even though
the enterprise does not cause the wrong.
31 Formally, to determine the second-best rule in a competitive market, one must weigh the
loss of economic surplus under personal liability (owing to the fact that the social marginal costs
of production would exceed the private marginal costs of production, which would result in an
equilibrium market price below social marginal costs) against the loss of surplus under vicarious
liability (owing to the fact that the private marginal costs of production would exceed the social
marginal costs, which would result in an equilibrium market price that exceeded social marginal
costs). Of course, this "second-best" rule may well be impossible to identify in practice, at least
on a case-by-case basis. Probably the best that can be done is to choose between vicarious
liability and personal liability in general classes of cases, based upon a rough analysis of the
economic costs and benefits of each rule.
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To examine this issue, suppose first that the costs to the enterprise
of using the incentive device are zero and that the incentive device
always prevents the assault - thus, the enterprise never actually pays
damages under a rule of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability is
clearly efficient under these circumstances, because it eliminates any
possibility of an assault at no cost to the enterprise.3 2
Now suppose that the incentive device reduces but does not elim-
inate the probability of the assault and that the reduction of the
expected damages from assaults when the incentive device is utilized
exceeds the costs of the incentive device. If the prospective victims
knew of their impending assault, they would offer the enterprise, and
the enterprise would accept, a side payment to use the incentive
device. The marginal costs of production for the enterprise would not
increase, and the incidence of assaults would decline with no adverse
effect on the level of enterprise activity.
Of course, such side payment schemes are unlikely to arise in
practice. In their absence, perhaps the only way to motivate the
employer to utilize the incentive device is to hold him liable for any
judgment against the employee. Under a strict liability theory, the
employer would always incur joint and several liability with the em-
ployee. Under a negligence theory, the employer could avoid liability
with a showing that the assault occurred despite the fact that he
utilized the appropriate incentive device.
Usually, vicarious liability in employment relationships (conven-
tional respondeat superior liability) is "strict" - the employer cannot
successfully defend the action by proving that he exercised all reason-
able means to dissuade the employee from committing the wrong. 33
In the present hypothetical, strict liability will indeed induce the
employer to utilize any and all incentive devices that are cost effective
in reducing his liability. Because the employer is not compensated for
the costs of the incentive devices as he would be under an idealized
side-payment scheme, however, and because he bears liability for
judgments against the potentially impecunious employee, the marginal
costs of production for enterprise output increase and the scale of
enterprise activity contracts to a point at which the prevailing price
exceeds the social marginal costs of production. To determine whether
vicarious liability has reduced or enhanced economic welfare, the
resulting loss of consumer and producer surplus must be weighed
against the reduction in the expected value of losses from assaults.
The welfare effects of vicarious liability are more favorable the greater
32 If workers value the opportunity to commit assaults and incorporate this factor into their
wage demands, however, or if monitoring behavior by employers imposes some disutility on the
workforce, workers may require higher compensation from enterprises that discourage assaults.
To this extent, no incentive device may be costless from the perspective of the employer.
33 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, at 501-02.
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the degree to which the incentive device reduces the probability of
assaults and the lower the costs to the enterprise of implementing the
incentive device.
An alternative approach to employer liability, as noted, is to im-
pose liability on the employer only if he is negligent and fails to use
the desired incentive device. Hereafter, this policy will be termed
"vicarious liability based on negligence" - a term that may suggest
that liability is not really vicarious at all, but that I employ here for
expositional convenience. In the present hypothetical, this approach
is unambiguously superior to strict vicarious liability, because the
employment of the tortfeasor does not increase the probability of the
wrong, and hence the associated liability is not properly included in
the social marginal costs of enterprise production. If the costs to the
enterprise of using the incentive device are significant, however, the
welfare consequences of vicarious liability based on negligence are still
ambiguous. Although the enterprise escapes liability if it uses the
incentive device, the costs of using it will become part of the marginal
costs of production for the enterprise. Price will rise and consumer
and producer surplus will fall. Again, to determine the net effect on
social welfare, this reduction of surplus must be weighed against the
benefits of the incentive device to potential assault victims. Other
things being equal, the lower the cost of using the incentive device,
and the greater its effectiveness, the more favorable are the welfare
effects of vicarious liability.34
The analysis developed above also applies, with only minor mod-
ifications, to vicarious liability outside the employment relationship.
Whenever an individual or business can dissuade wrongdoing at little
or no cost through the adoption of incentives that affect the behavior
of potential wrongdoers, 35 the imposition of vicarious liability can
34 One final complication relates to the possibility that unemployment may be the "cause" of
certain types of wrongs. Specifically, workers who are unemployed may commit any number
of intentional or accidental wrongs, the probability of which declines or disappears once they
are employed. The employment relationship thereby creates a social benefit for which employers
may not be compensated: in an ideal world, employees' wage demands would be reduced to the
extent that their employment eliminates the possibility of certain liability judgments against
them. Employers thereby would be "compensated" for this ancillary benefit of employment.
Even if employees take such factors into account in their wage demands, however, those
demands will not fall by the full amount of the expected liability averted by employment if the
employees cannot pay judgments against them.
Clearly, such a benefit is difficult to incorporate into the design of a liability rule, but its
existence may in some cases weigh against the imposition of vicarious liability because vicarious
liability will increase the costs of production for business enterprises and lead to a reduced level
of production and employment.
3S For a slight variation in the analysis, suppose that an employer has advance notice that
his employee is about to commit a murder and can avert the murder by reporting the employee
to the police - an arguably inexpensive "incentive device" from the employer's perspective. It
probably would be efficient to impose a duty upon the employer to make the report. Of course,
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motivate the adoption of such incentive devices and will be efficient
whenever the benefit of reduced malfeasance exceeds the social costs
of those incentive devices. 36 When the "causal" relationship between
the activities of the entity subject to vicarious liability and the pro-
spective wrong is weak, however, vicarious liability based on negli-
gence is superior to strict vicarious liability.
The one caveat to this proposition relates to administrative costs,
which are an important consideration in any economic analysis of
liability rules. One must always be 'alert to the possibility that one
liability rule may be cheaper to administer than another or may tend
to produce fewer meritless suits. With respect to the choice between
strict vicarious liability and vicarious liability based on negligence,
the negligence approach probably leads to incrementally higher ad-
ministrative costs associated with the need to litigate the employer's
negligence, whereas the strict liability approach probably leads to
incrementally higher administrative costs associated with a higher
number of lawsuits. 37 The analysis to follow (except where noted)
assumes that these costs roughly cancel out, so that the administrative
cost factor does not weigh substantially in favor of either regime.
(b) Second-Best Issues: Victims Who Are Not Passive. - Suppose
now that tort victims can take precautions to guard against being
victimized and that they can (and will) curtail whatever activities
expose them to the possibility of a wrong. Under these assumptions,
no conventional tort liability rule can induce both injurers and victims
to behave optimally (if the victim is not a party to a voluntary
transaction with the business enterprise, as assumed above).38
Specifically, either a negligence regime or a strict liability regime,
coupled with an appropriate contributory negligence defense or its
equivalent, arguably can induce both injurers and victims to take
cost-effective precautions during the course of their activities (assum-
ing no insolvency on the part of either). Despite the exercise of such
precautions, however, some injuries may occur. The frequency of
injuries might be reduced if injurers and victims reduced their partic-
ipation in activities that create a risk of injury. Indeed, an efficient
there is no reason to limit such a duty to employers; anyone who has advance notice of the
prospect of a serious crime, and can avert the crime at little cost to himself by informing the
police, arguably should have a duty to inform. The imposition of liability for failure to report
is one way, though certainly not the only way, to encourage the desired behavior.
36 To be sure, the value that society places on individual liberty and autonomy may constrain
the degree to which vicarious liability is imposed under these conditions. To put it another
way, any undesirable infringement of individual liberty and autonomy that might result from
the imposition of vicarious liability and the resultant monitoring of some individuals by others
is properly viewed as an economic cost.
37 See, e.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 5, at 65-66 (comparing the costs of
administering strict liability and negligence standards).
38 See Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. i (ig8o).
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adjustment in such activity levels will occur on the part of any party
who bears the full costs of the injuries that occur despite the exercise
of due care. Yet it is impossible (with conventional liability rules) for
all parties to bear those costs. Under negligence, victims bear such
costs, and injurers avoid them; the opposite result occurs under strict
liability. Hence, whichever regime prevails, either victims or injurers
will fail to make an efficient adjustment in their activity levels. 39
As a result, the choice between strict liability and negligence is an
exercise in "second-best" analysis. If it is more efficient for injurers
to internalize losses when everyone exercises due care, a rule of strict
liability with a contributory negligence defense is superior; if it is more
efficient for victims to bear losses when everyone exercises due care,
a rule of negligence with a contributory negligence defense is supe-
rior.40
Related second-best issues arise when the injurer is judgment-proof
and a court must decide whether to impose vicarious liability on the
injurer's employer - the choice between personal liability and vicar-
ious liability under these circumstances plainly affects the degree of
cost internalization by injurers and victims. Putting aside the effects
of the liability rule on the efficiency of risk-sharing and precautionary
behavior, a rule of personal liability, which induces victims to curtail
their activities, may sometimes be more efficient than a rule of vicar-
ious liability, which leads employers to curtail their activities (or their
employee's activities). The reverse possibility also exists if it is more
efficient for employers to reduce activities than for victims to do so.
Thus, once the assumption of passivity on the part of victims is
relaxed, the choice between personal liability and vicarious liability
becomes considerably more complicated if employees are judgment-
proof. Vicarious liability then affects the balance of cost internaliza-
tion by injurers and victims, and it may be quite unclear how this
balance should be struck, just as it may be unclear whether negligence
or strict liability is the better rule to govern the liability of the em-
ployee.
Of course, if employees are able to pay judgments in full, vicarious
liability will not affect the amount of compensation paid to victims. 4 1
Victims' behavior - their choice of precautions and activity levels -
39 Of course, if "contributory negligence" existed whenever the victim failed to engage in the
"first-best" activity level, in addition to those instances in which the victim failed to exercise
due care, and if "negligence" existed whenever the injurer failed to engage in the "first-best"
activity level, then either strict liability or negligence with a contributory negligence defense
might achieve a first-best outcome. Judgments about the first-best activity level are presumably
beyond the competence of the courts in all but exceptional cases, however, and ordinarily are
not addressed in the analysis of negligence or contributory negligence.
40 See Shavell, supra note 38.
41 This assumes that the computation of damages will not be affected, for example, by the
presence of a "deep-pocket" defendant.
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will then be unaffected by the choice between personal liability and
vicarious liability, and the analysis can proceed as if the victims are
"passive."
Furthermore, even if employees are judgment-proof, classes of
cases arise in which cost internalization by injurers and their employ-
ers is clearly more efficient than cost internalization by victims. 4 2 In
these cases, the analysis can also proceed as if victims are "passive,"
because the greater degree of cost internalization by employers under
vicarious liability is unambiguously beneficial. Alternatively, vicarious
liability may considerably improve the efficiency of risk-sharing or the
efficiency of precautionary behavior by injurers, and these efficiencies
may outweigh any inefficiencies of vicarious liability resulting from
reduced cost internalization by victims.
In addition, observe that if the choice between vicarious liability
and personal liability does not affect the amount of damages awarded
to victims (although it obviously may affect how much of any award
they can collect), then vicarious liability results in the same cost
internalization by enterprises that cause injuries, and the same cost
internalization by victims, that would result if all employees who cause
injuries could pay judgments against them in full. Thus, if one sup-
poses that the degree of cost internalization by injurers and victims is
roughly efficient when employees can pay judgments in full, vicarious
liability is an attractive method of promoting that degree of cost
internalization.
Finally, whether or not victims are "passive," and irrespective of
the appropriate degree of cost internalization by injurers and victims,
the implications of enterprise causation remain much the same. The
more the employment relationship contributes to the probability of the
wrong, the greater the economic benefits (if any) of strict vicarious
liability, other things being equal. Similarly, if the enterprise does not
even partially cause the wrong, strict vicarious liability is inferior to
vicarious liability based upon negligence. Vicarious liability based
upon negligence may in turn be inferior to personal liability, depending
upon such factors as the cost and effectiveness of the incentive devices
available to the employer.
II. THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT RULE
The law places agency relationships into several categories, and
the rules governing the vicarious tort liability of an employer or
"principal" depend critically upon the category into which the agency
falls. Most employer-employee relationships are "master-servant" re-
42 For example, victims may perceive the risk of injury as de minimis and thus ignore it in
deciding on their activity levels. See infra note 53; supra note 27.
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lationships, in which the master controls or has the right to control
the physical conduct of the servant in the performance of the servant's
duties. 43 Absent the requisite degree of control, however, the em-
ployee may be classified as an independent contractor or other non-
servant agent. 4" Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, masters
are liable for torts that their servants commit within the scope of
employment. If the tortfeasor is an independent contractor or non-
servant agent, however, with some exceptions, the principal or em-
ployer is not liable for the tort.45
The discussion to follow focuses upon respondeat superior and
specifically upon the scope of employment limitation to the master's
liability. The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines the "scope of
employment" as follows:
(i) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but
only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master,
and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the
use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it
is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized
time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the
master.46
According to the Restatement, masters are not liable for torts
committed by their servants outside the scope of employment unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or (b) the
master was negligent or reckless, or (c) the conduct violated a non-
43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(I)-(2) (1958); PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 20, at 501-08.
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
20, at 5o9-16.
45 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 409 (x965); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, at 5O-i6; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 99-104 (1979); W. SELL, AGENCY 84-
92 (1975). The economic basis for the distinction between "servants" and "independent contrac-
tors," and the basis for the various exceptions to the independent contractor rule, are discussed
at length in Sykes, supra note i, at 1259-79.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958); see also id. § 229 (kind of conduct
within scope of employment); id. § 230 (acts forbidden by master); id. § 231 (criminal or
intentionally tortious acts); id. § 232 (failure to act); id. § 233 (time of service); id. § 234 (area
of service); id. § 235 (conduct not for purpose of serving master); id. § 236 (conduct actuated
by dual purpose); id. § 237 (re-entry into employment).
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delegable duty of the master, or (d) the servant purported to act or to
speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent
authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence
of the agency relation. 4 7
The commentators offer somewhat simpler definitions. 48 Seavey,
for example, suggested that a tort is within the scope of employment
if "it can be said rationally that the employment is the primary cause
of the tort. '49 According to Prosser and Keeton, the scope of em-
ployment encompasses "acts which are so closely connected with what
the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental
to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite
improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment." 50
All of these characterizations Are somewhat ambiguous and provide
only modest insight into the application of the scope of employment
rule in practice. To facilitate concrete discussion of the rule and its
economic consequences, this Part considers two groups of cases: cases
involving torts by servants during a purported "frolic and detour"
from their employment and cases involving intentional torts by ser-
vants. The analysis concludes with a brief discussion of the duty of
a master to control conduct of a servant that is outside the scope of
employment.
A. Frolic and Detour
A "frolic" or "detour" from employment occurs when an employee,
while on travel for the employer, deviates from his assigned tasks for
personal errands or other personal business. Not surprisingly, most
frolic and detour cases involve motor vehicle torts. Thus, it is instruc-
tive to review the economic issues that arise with respect to motor
47 Id. § 2 19(2).
48 In addition to efforts to define the scope of employment, several commentators have
advanced suggestions for reform or rationalization of the scope-of-employment limitation. In an
article on frolic and detour cases, Smith suggests limiting the scope of employment to a "zone
of risk" - vicarious liability would be imposed only if the enterprise is a "contributing cause"
of the tort and the deviation from the servant's regular employment that led to the tort was
"probable" in light of what the servant was employed to do. See Smith, supra note 29, at 724-
25, 728. James argues for the imposition of vicarious liability for all reasonably foreseeable
risks incidental to the enterprise. See James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REv. 16I, 174-
8o (I954). Morris criticizes any limitation of liability to foreseeable risks on the ground that
most enterprises purchase insurance; insurance actuaries, Morris suggests, estimate risks by
generalizing from the experience of many entrepreneurs with many types of risks, so that the
ability of a particular entrepreneur to foresee a particular risk is irrelevant. See Morris,
Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process - The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J.
554 (1961).
49 W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 148 (1964).
50 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2o, at 502.
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vehicle torts when no issue of enterprise causation is present.51 Sup-
pose, for example, that a truck driver negligently causes an accident
while making a delivery for his employer. If the driver precisely
followed the route suggested by the employer, and undertook no per-
sonal business during the trip, then the accident is fully caused by the
employer's enterprise.5 2
As earlier analysis suggests, the choice between personal liability
and vicarious liability is arguably immaterial if the truck driver carries
enough insurance to pay any judgment against him in full. The
compensable costs of accidents are fully internalized by the enterprise
(the truck driver's wages must compensate him for the cost of the
insurance necessary to cover on-the-job accidents). Furthermore, vi-
carious liability will not enhance the efficiency of risk-sharing because
the driver's insurance company is at least as efficient a risk bearer as
the employer.
In many instances, however, the driver will not have insurance,
or the insurance that he does have will be inadequate to pay the
judgment in full, particularly if the judgment is large. Vicarious
liability then has two obvious benefits. First, it will force the enter-
prise to bear a greater proportion of the cost of the accidents that it
"causes." Second, it will shift risk from the driver and accident victim,
who are probably relatively poor risk bearers, to the employer or his
insurance company, who are likely to be superior risk bearers.
Even if the employer will not seek indemnity from the employee,
vicarious liability is unlikely to reduce significantly the driver's incen-
tives to avoid the commission of motor vehicle torts. The widespread
existence of private automobile insurance policies suggests that the
efficiencies that accompany the shifting of risk to a superior risk bearer
outweigh any moral hazard problem attendant upon insurance for
motor vehicle accidents. Similar efficiencies in risk-bearing should
arise when the employer "insures" the driver.
One question remains: does reduced cost internalization by victims
under vicarious liability, and a resulting inefficient increase in their
activity levels as drivers or pedestrians, offset the other benefits of
vicarious liability? This result seems improbable, as there is no ap-
parent reason why cost internalization by the victims of motor vehicle
torts should be systematically preferred to cost internalization by in-
jurers. Indeed, although cost internalization may induce an efficient
adjustment in the activity levels of employees who are potential in-
51 Such issues are discussed at some length in Sykes, supra note x, at 1268-71.
52 That is, if one assumes that unemployed people engage in approximately the same amount
of personal driving as employed people, then the incremental probability of injuries in the course
of business-related driving done by a truck driver is entirely attributable to the business enter-
prise.
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jurers, it may have little impact on the activity levels of potential
victims acting in their personal capacity. 53
How does the analysis change if the tort is not "caused" by the
enterprise? Suppose, for example, that an employee has an accident
while shopping for groceries on his own time over the weekend - an
activity clearly unrelated to the enterprise. Under these circum-
stances, the imposition of vicarious liability would place a cost on the
enterprise that was not related to any wrong "caused" by its activi-
ties. 54 The price of the enterprise's goods or services would rise
inefficiently, and consumer and producer surplus would decline. Vi-
carious liability would then be inefficient unless (a) it caused the
employer to adopt incentive devices that produced a reduction in the
incidence of motor vehicle torts by employees that was substantial
enough to offset the inefficiencies of imposing added costs on the
enterprise, or (b) it resulted in an increase in the efficiency of risk-
sharing that offset those inefficiencies.
As to possibility (a), it is doubtful that an employer could reduce
significantly the number of motor vehicle torts committed by employ-
ees on personal business. Obviously, the employer cannot deter such
torts cost effectively by observing and correcting negligent behavior
in advance of an accident. In addition, because many motor vehicle
torts probably are attributable to carelessness or momentary lapse of
attention rather than to calculated risk-taking, the ability of an em-
ployer to affect substantially the probability of motor vehicle torts
through threats of discharge or other such incentives within the em-
ployment relationship is quite limited. It thus seems improbable, or
at least highly conjectural, that the benefits of a reduced accident rate
under vicarious liability would be substantial enough to justify the
imposition of added costs on the business enterprise.
With regard to possibility (b), any risk-sharing benefits would also
53 Businesses are interested in overall profitability. The imposition of additional costs on a
business will affect profitability and thus affect investment decisions concerning the scale of
business activity. Hence, one would expect that cost internalization by businesses, particularly
large businesses for which periodic accident liability is highly probable, will have a systematic
impact on their activity levels.
In the case of individuals, however, a slightly greater or lesser degree of cost internalization
with respect to fairly low-probability events may have little impact on decisionmaking. The
activity of walking, for example, may not be greatly affected by the choice between vicarious
liability and personal liability, because the slightly greater risk of uncompensated injury (for
example, by a negligent driver) under personal liability may be so small that individuals do not
consider this risk in choosing whether to walk. If so, then no inefficiencies could arise from
the reduction in cost internalization by pedestrians under a rule of vicarious liability; in effect,
such victims are "passive."
54 An indemnity action to recover that cost would itself be costly, and thus enterprise costs
will increase even with an indemnity action.
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be offset at least in part by the inefficiency of imposing costs on the
enterprise that are unconnected to its operation and by added costs
of litigation.5 5 Moreover, many (though not all) of the costs of per-
sonal injuries are covered by first-party insurance policies and, to that
extent, risk-sharing is reasonably efficient even without transferring
losses to the employer. Thus, the imposition of vicarious liability
probably could not be justified simply as a means of increasing the
efficiency of risk-sharing.
The law is basically consistent with this analysis. A motor vehicle
tort committed by an employee while on a personal shopping trip on
his day off, for example, is unquestionably outside the scope of em-
ployment, and his employer will escape liability under the scope of
employment rule.5 6 In most reported frolic and detour cases, however,
the tort occurs while the employee is on "company time" but is at
least arguably engaged in personal business. The analysis of such
cases is only slightly more difficult.
For example, assume that an employee runs a personal errand
during a business trip and commits a motor vehicle tort during the
personal errand. Assume further, however, that the employee would
run an identical personal errand on his own time even if he had no
affiliation with the employer. Under this assumption, the existence of
the employment relationship has no effect on the ex ante probability
of the tort. For the reasons given above, therefore, it is probably
inefficient to impose liability on the employer. Indeed, in reaction to
the imposition of vicarious liability, an employer might attempt to
discourage employees from performing personal errands while on com-
pany business. Yet society may actually benefit if employers permit
employees to perform such errands, because the employee's total com-
pany and personal travel will decline, thereby reducing the overall
likelihood of a tort, as well as the cost of travel.
On the other hand, some torts committed during personal errands
are "caused" by the enterprise. If an agent travels on business to a
distant city, for example, and his lack of familiarity with the city
streets considerably increases the probability of an accident, any re-
sulting tort is to a considerable extent "caused" by the enterprise.
Hence, the following principle would, in theory, provide a reason-
ss The creation of a social insurance fund to compensate motor vehicle tort victims who
cannot recover fully from tortfeasors is probably a superior policy alternative. Such a fund
could achieve comparable risk-sharing benefits without the high transaction costs of the tort
system (although, to be sure, taxes to finance such a fund might have their own misallocative
effects). Such funds already exist to some extent in many states in the form of state-administered
"uninsured motorist" funds and are financed in part by a vehicle registration tax on all owners
of motor vehicles who fail to present evidence of a minimum level of insurance coverage.
56 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2o, at 5o3-o5.
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ably efficient disposition of the frolic and detour cases involving motor
vehicle torts. If a motor vehicle tort occurs during a personal errand
of the employee, the employer incurs vicarious liability for the tort
only if (a) the tort arose during an errand of the sort that probably
would not have occurred absent the existence of the employment
relationship, or (b) for some other reason, the probability of the tort
was substantially increased by the existence of the employment rela-
tionship - for example, the tort occurred because the employee was
unfamiliar with the area in which he was required to travel.
The courts' approach to frolic and detour cases, however, is often
quite different. In many cases, the courts focus on the length of the
detour from the employee's business travel route as the test for vicar-
ious liability - the employer is only liable for torts committed when
the employee makes "short" detours.57 Such a focus seems inefficient
because the relationship between enterprise causation and the mag-
nitude of the departure from an assigned route appears quite weak.
An employee may stop for personal business that he would transact
anyway without any significant departure from his route, and an
employee who travels across country on business may make an exten-
sive detour for sightseeing that he would not undertake absent his
business travel.58
Other courts focus on the foreseeability of the employee's deviation
from his route as the test for vicarious liability.59 This approach
might seem reasonable, as employers can hardly undertake to deter
behavior that they cannot foresee. Yet it is the foreseeability of the
tort that is important to the design of whatever incentives the em-
ployer might wish to utilize, not the foreseeability of its location, and
motor vehicle torts by traveling agents are almost always foreseeable.
More importantly, the degree of enterprise causation bears no apparent
relationship to the foreseeability of the employee's detour. Hence, the
foreseeability test that is applied in many frolic and detour cases also
seems economically unsound.
57 See, e.g., Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 231 N.Y. 301, 132 N.E. 97 (1921) (imposing vicarious
liability for a four-block departure from the assigned route); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 234 (1958). See generally W. SEAVEY, supra note 49, at x51-52 (discussing various
detour cases).
58 To be sure, it may be desirable from the employer's perspective to permit his employees
to take short detours while on company time - the benefit to the employee may well outweigh
the slight cost to the employer and thereby allow for a more than offsetting reduction in the
employee's compensation. Yet the mere fact that the employer implicitly authorizes short detours
should not result in liability for accidents that occur in the course of such detours. As noted
earlier, that policy may simply motivate the employer to prohibit personal errands on company
time altogether, with a resulting increase in the overall likelihood of torts.
59 See, e.g., Kohlman v. Hyland, 54 N.D. 710, 21o N.W. 643 (1926); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 2o, at 504-05.
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B. Intentional Torts
The basic principles that govern the efficiency of vicarious liability
for intentional torts are developed in Part I above, through the various
hypotheticals involving employee assaults. 60 In analyzing the case
law with respect to these principles, it is instructive to divide inten-
tional torts by employees into two categories: torts that arise from the
employee's purely personal motivations, and torts that occur when the
employee acts to serve the principal. This division highlights impor-
tant distinctions in existing law as well as important distinctions in
the effects of vicarious liability on resource allocation.
As to the first category, vicarious liability is likely to be efficient
(subject to the usual second-best caveats concerning victims' incen-
tives), even if an intentional tort has a seemingly personal motiva-
tion, 61 when two conditions hold. First, the tort must be "caused,"
at least in large part, by the employment relationship. Second, the
imposition of liability on the employer must not excessively reduce the
employee's incentives to avoid wrongful conduct. 62
The second of these conditions for efficiency is familiar. The first
condition, however, requires further discussion. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that an intentional tort occurs because the existence of the enter-
prise causes the employee to encounter unusual circumstances that he
would not otherwise encounter. Intrinsically stressful occupations, for
60 See supra pp. 573-79.
61 It is important to recognize that vicarious liability provides fewer risk-sharing benefits in
the case of intentional torts than in the case of unintentional torts, because intentional torts
involve fewer uncertainties. Specifically, suppose that employees are never held liable for
intentional torts that they do not commit, that employees never "accidentally" commit intentional
torts, and that the employee can accurately foresee the amount of the judgment that will result
from a tortious act. Then, there is no risk to share between the employer and the employee -
the employee knows that tortious behavior will result in a claim against him in a certain amount
and that otherwise no claim will arise. Risk is nonexistent for him because there is a determin-
istic relationship between his behavior and the judgment.
With respect to potential tort victims, however, risk still exists. Hence, opportunities for
beneficial risk-sharing between employers and tort victims may still arise.
62 In one sense, the tortious conduct of an intentional tortfeasor is often "observable" by a
vicariously liable employer because intentional torts usually result in judgments against the
tortfeasor about which the vicariously liable employer will have knowledge. Indeed, if tortious
behavior always leads to a judgment, then the employer's awareness of the existence or nonex-
istence of a judgment is tantamount to awareness of the existence or nonexistence of tortious
behavior. This situation is quite distinct from most unintentional torts; an employee can exceed
the speed limit a thousand times, for example, but never have an accident.
The "observability" of the employee's behavior in this sense may not help the employer to
deter his torts. A distinction must be drawn between direct observation of tortious conduct and
inferential "observation" based on the existence of a judgment. In the latter case, the observation
of behavior is necessarily subsequent to the tort. Thus, the employer cannot intervene to
discourage the commission of the tort but can only exact an ex post penalty. As discussed
earlier, ex post penalties, such as costly indemnity actions, may be quite inferior to ex ante
penalties based upon observation of potentially tortious behavior.
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example, may precipitate intentional torts. In such cases, the business
enterprise "causes" the tort even though the employee's tortious be-
havior may evince a purely personal motivation.
Most hornbook statements of the law suggest that vicarious liabil-
ity will not apply if an agent acts out of personal ill will. Rather, the
employee must act out of a purpose to serve the employer. 6 3 Recent
case law, however, reflects a more flexible approach that appears
consistent with the efficiency analysis. For example, one California
court upheld the imposition of vicarious liability against a building
subcontractor for his drunken employee's assault of two employees of
the general contractor.6 4 The court reasoned that the tort resulted
from the tortfeasor's perception of his rights as an employee. 65
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has held that a jury could impose
vicarious liability on a trucking company whose deliveryman raped a
customer.66 Crucial to the holding was the court's observation that
the deliveryman's "badge of employment" enabled him to secure entry
to the victim's premises. 67 This result appears efficient if one assumes
that the probability of a rape was considerably enhanced by the
deliveryman's employment status.
Finally, in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States,68 the
Second Circuit affirmed the imposition of vicarious liability upon the
Coast Guard for vandalism by a drunken sailor. Observing that "the
proclivity of seamen to find solace for solitude by copious resort to
the bottle while ashore has been noted in opinions too numerous to
warrant citation," 69 Judge Friendly suggested that vicarious liability
was appropriate because the tort was caused by the nature of the
tortfeasor's employment.70
63 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (I958); PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 20, at 505-06; W. SEAVEY, supra note 49, at 157.
64 See Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 5o Cal. App. 3d 6o8, 124 Cal. Rptr. T43 (i975).
6S See id. at 621-22, 124 Cal. Rptr. at i51.
66 See Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
67 See id. at 651-52.
68 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. I968).
69 Id. at 172.
70 The following passage from Judge Friendly's opinion supports the interpretation of the
case as implicitly resting on notions of enterprise causation:
One can readily think of cases that fall on the other side of the line. If Lane [the sailor]
had set fire to the bar where he had been imbibing or had caused an accident on the
street while returning to the drydock, the Government would not be liable; the activities
of the "enterprise" do not reach into areas where the servant does not create risks different
from those attendant on the activities of the community in general .... We agree with
the district judge that if the seaman "upon returning to the drydock, recognized the
Bushey security guard as his wife's lover and shot him," . . . vicarious liability would
not follow; the incident would have related to the seaman's domestic life, not to his
seafaring activity,... and it would have been the most unlikely happenstance that the
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The other major class of intentional tort cases - in which the tort
occurs at least in part because the agent seeks to further the interests
of his principal - raises entirely familiar issues. In these cases, there
is rarely any question that the existence of the agency "causes" the
tort. 71 Hence, subject to the previously discussed danger that vicar-
ious liability may reduce the incentives of employees to avoid wrongful
conduct or necessitate a spate of costly indemnity actions, the greater
willingness of courts to impose vicarious liability in these cases 72 is
economically sound.
C. Duty of a Master To Control Conduct of a Servant
That Is Outside the Scope of Employment
Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his
servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent
him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself
as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or
upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as
his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control. 73
Under certain conditions, section 317 seemingly imposes vicarious
liability on employers for tortious acts committed by employees that
are not "caused" by the enterprise. Interestingly, however, vicarious
liability will arise only if the employer is negligent - if he breaches
his duty to exercise reasonable care. Thus, section 317 differs from
conventional respondeat superior liability, which is strict. As noted
earlier, strict vicarious liability is less efficient than vicarious liability
based on negligence if the enterprise does not cause the tort. To this
extent, if the scope of employment is circumscribed to encompass only
71 See Straiton v. Rosinsky, 183 Pa. Super. 545, 133 A.2d 257 (1957) (imposing vicarious
liability on a theatre after an usher struck an unruly child with a flashlight); Howard v. Zaney
Bar, 369 Pa. 155, 85 A.2d 401 (1952) (refusing to impose vicarious liability on a bar when a
bartender shot a patron who harassed a female customer).
72 See, e.g., Straiton, 183 Pa. Super. at 547-48, 133 A.2d at 259; PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 2o, at 505-o6; W. SEAVEY, supra note 49, at 157. But see Howard, 369 Pa. 155,
85 A.2d 401.
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
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those torts substantially "caused" by the business enterprise, section
317's approach to torts committed outside the scope of employment is
clearly efficient.
Section 317's requirement that the employer know or have reason
to know that he has the ability, opportunity and need for control is
also efficient. If the employer lacks such knowledge, vicarious liability
imposes additional costs on the enterprise that lead to higher prices
for enterprise goods and services without any attendant benefits to
tort victims.
The requirement that the employee be on the employer's premises
or be using the employer's chattels, however, is somewhat suspect.
Perhaps one could argue that under such conditions the employer is
more likely to be able to dissuade misconduct cheaply. Yet even if
employees are on the employer's premises, close supervision of workers
is sometimes quite costly; so too may be the supervision of an employee
who uses a chattel at a considerable distance from the employer's
premises. In addition, this requirement prevents the imposition of
liability on the employer in some cases in which the employer can
dissuade misconduct quite cheaply. To return to the example of the
drunken sailor, an officer drinking at the same bar as an enlisted man
may be able to dissuade the enlisted man's behavior quite easily. Yet,
because the enlisted man is away from his boat and is not using his
employer's chattel, the employer would escape liability under the Re-
statement.
The application of section 317 in practice, however, is much more
limited than its language might suggest. Cases citing section 317 or
its earlier incarnation in the first Restatement, as well as the cases
that the Restatement cites as the basis for section 317, primarily
involve acts that would not have occurred absent the existence of the
enterprise. Such cases do not raise issues of enterprise causation and
might be better handled by treating the tort as within the scope of
employment. 74 Moreover, cases that rely on section 317 generally
involve rather obvious acts of negligence on the part of the employer
- for example, the knowing retention of an incompetent employee or
the knowing allowance of dangerous practices by an employee even
though relatively inexpensive measures could have stopped the prac-
tices. 75
74 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Baltimore & Potomac R.R., 168 U.S. i35 (1897) (finding that the
employer knowingly allowed workers to throw firewood off moving trains); McCrink v. City of
New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947) (holding that the city knowingly retained
policeman with propensity for drunkenness who later shot two people while intoxicated on duty);
Hogle v. H.H. Franklin Mfg. Co., igg N.Y. 388, 92 N.E. 794 (191o) (finding that the employer
allowed employees to throw objects out of a factory window). These cases are cited in the
Reporter's notes to Section 317. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 appendix, at 24
(1965); id. at 25-27 (listing court citations to the first Restatement).
75 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 74.
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One area that raises more difficult issues, however, is the growing
line of cases imposing liability on employers for "negligent hiring."
Typically, though not always, these cases involve intentional torts by
employees with a history of criminal conduct or violent behavior that
purportedly suggests unfitness for the job that they are employed to
perform.
Vicarious liability may be efficient in these cases if the job subjects
the tortfeasor to unusual stress or temptation or otherwise places him
in circumstances that are especially conducive to repetition of past
misbehavior. For example, it seems quite imprudent for a landlord
to hire a convicted rapist as a security guard and give him a pass key
to tenants' apartments. If a rape occurs as a result, the imposition of
liability on the landlord is probably efficient, as the employment re-
lationship seemingly facilitated ("caused") the tort. Even if the em-
ployer can do little to control the behavior of the guard after he is
hired, liability will encourage the employer to perform a careful back-
ground check on applicants for such positions and to reject those
applicants whose backgrounds are unsuitable. 76
Vicarious liability is potentially inefficient, however, if the nature
of the employment does not increase the likelihood of misbehavior,
unless the employer has an opportunity cheaply and effectively to
dissuade misconduct through monitoring or supervision. Cases that
impose liability upon the employer for an assault by an employee
against a co-worker or customer, principally because the employer had
knowledge that the tortfeasor had committed assaults or other crimes
in the past, 77 are quite troubling. Absent a showing that the employer
76 Few cases are so easy. Suppose, for example, that a background check of the applicant
reveals that he once was discharged for sleeping on the job, that he had an arrest record for
minor crimes, and that a female co-worker had once complained that he "made eyes at her."
See Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, 69 Ill. App. 3d 920, 926-27, 387 N.E.2d 1241, 1244-
45 (1979) (reviewing a claim of attempted sexual assault by a security guard who used his pass
key to gain access to the tenant's apartment). The employer in this case was held liable for
compensatory damages under an Illinois statute that imposed liability on detective agencies for
the misconduct of their employees. See ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, para. 201-iob(io) (1975)
(repealed 1984).
The employee's background would not have signaled to most employers that he might commit
a rape. Nonetheless, security guards may face exceptional temptation and opportunity for
malfeasance. The imposition of strict vicarious liability on employers of security guards who
use their positions to facilitate criminal or tortious activity, as was accomplished by the Illinois
statute in Easley, may then be justified because much of their malfeasance is arguably "caused"
by their employment status.
77 See, e.g., Najera v. Southern Pac. Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 634, 639 n.3, 13 Cal. Rptr.
146, 149 n.3 (i96r) (citing cases recognizing "the common law liability of employers for their
direct negligence in hiring or retaining in their employ persons with known characteristics which
might subject other persons to danger"); Tatham v. Wabash R.R., 412 Ill. 568, io7 N.E.2d 735
(1952) (holding that a complaint alleging that the employer knowingly employed a dangerous
man to work with the plaintiff stated a cause of action in negligence under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act).
[Vol. 101:563
HeinOnline  -- 101 Harv. L. Rev.  592 1987-1988
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
was in a position to intervene to prevent the assault and neglected to
do so, the imposition of liability in these cases may simply cause the
costs of production for the employer's enterprise to increase with no
offsetting reduction in the incidence of wrongdoing. Alternatively,
and much more probably, employers will choose not to hire individuals
with a criminal record or other history of antisocial behavior. 78 So-
ciety then loses the value of the labor services of such individuals,
and their resulting inability to find gainful employment may well
increase their propensity to commit wrongs.
79
IL. OTHER APPLICATIONS
The economic principles developed above adapt readily to the
study of the efficiency of vicarious liability in other areas. This Part
78 Arguably, if an employer has knowledge of an employee's violent propensities, he should
at least have a duty to disclose those propensities to other employees to enable them to protect
themselves. The difficulty with such a duty to disclose, however, is that disclosure may make
it difficult or impossible for the individual who is the subject of the disclosure to work produc-
tively with fellow employees. As a consequence, prospective employers may simply decline to
hire individuals with any history of violent behavior, with the adverse consequences discussed
in the text.
79 An interesting and novel application of the "negligent hiring" doctrine is found in Di
Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 450 A.2d 508 (1982). In that case, the employer - a Boy Scout
camp - allegedly knew that its employee owned firearms and kept them in his living quarters
on the grounds of the camp. During a social visit by the employee's nephew, his mother, and
a 19-year-old camp counselor, the counselor found a loaded handgun and accidentally shot the
employee's nephew. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the plaintiff should have been
allowed to reach the jury on the issue of negligent hiring or supervision.
The weakness of the causal relation between the injury and the employment relation in Di
Cosala is clear. The injury occurred during a social visit by the plaintiff to his uncle's house,
a visit that could just as easily have taken place with the same unfortunate outcome in the
absence of the employment relation.
In addition, the case differs dramatically from most negligent hiring cases in that no inten-
tional misconduct by the employee was involved (the employee was not even present at the time
of the accident), and no question was raised about the employee's character or fitness for his
position. Rather, the plaintiff's theory was simply that the employer had knowledge that the
firearms were present and should have refused to allow them to be kept in living quarters that
the employer had supplied to the employee on the grounds of the camp.
Despite the rather unusual circumstances of this case, vicarious liability is at least arguably
efficient. Given the propensity of children to play with firearms, and the serious danger of
resulting accidents, it is perhaps negligent to store them at all at a Scout camp, at least without
special precautions. Although the principal danger created by such negligence is that of injury
to a camper, the possibility of injury to a social guest also plainly exists. An employer with
actual knowledge that the firearms are in the possession of an employee under these conditions
can insist that they be removed from the camp or be safely stored. The implementation of such
a policy probably costs the employer very little (simply the effort of issuing a verbal command),
and employees ordinarily can be expected to abide by the policy. The case thus seemingly
presents an instance in which, despite the weakness of the causal relation between the tort and
the employment relation, vicarious liability is justified because the employer has an opportunity
to dissuade misconduct cheaply and effectively through supervision.
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explores the vicarious liability of motor vehicle owners who lend their
cars to third parties who cause injury, of premises owners whose
guests or tenants suffer torts committed by intruders, and of employers
whose employees are sexually harassed by their supervisors or co-
workers. These topics introduce new twists to the analysis, such as
the significance of contractual relationships between the party to be
charged with vicarious liability and the injured party (in the premises
liability and sexual harassment cases). Like the cases analyzed in
Section II, these cases also raise interesting questions about causation.
A. The Vicarious Liability of Motor Vehicle Owners
A motor vehicle owner's liability for torts committed by a driver
who borrows the owner's vehicle varies considerably among jurisdic-
tions.80 In some states, the owner only incurs liability for a tort
committed by the other driver when the owner himself committed
some act of negligence, such as entrusting the vehicle to a driver
known to be incompetent, or allowing a driver to drive recklessly
while the owner is riding as a passenger.8' The modern trend, how-
ever, is toward an expansion of owners' liability for the negligence of
other drivers, with an increasing prevalence of strict vicarious liability
in many jurisdictions. Some states permit plaintiffs to argue that an
owner who rides as a passenger retains a right of control over the
driver that creates a "master-servant relationship," thereby subjecting
the owner to liability under a theory of respondeat superior.82 One
state imposes strict liability on the theory that because the automobile
is a "dangerous instrumentality," the owner incurs liability for the
negligence of anyone to whom he entrusts it.83 Another basis for strict
vicarious liability is the "family purpose doctrine," under which family
members are deemed "agents" of the owner when using the automobile
for a "family purpose. '8 4 Finally, about a dozen states have imposed
strict vicarious liability through "automobile consent" statutes.85
These statutes generally hold automobile owners liable for the negli-
gence of anyone who uses the automobile with the owner's express or
implied permission.
As with any form of vicarious liability, imposing liability on au-
tomobile owners would have no economic consequences if the drivers
could always pay judgments against them in full (with or without the
aid of insurance) and if drivers and owners could costlessly negotiate
80 For a reasonably complete survey of motor vehicle owners' liability across jurisdictions,
see PROSSER & KEETON, cited in note 20 above, § 73, at 522-28.
81 See id. at 523.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 524.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 527.
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between themselves to allocate the risk of civil liability. The ultimate
incidence of liability would then be determined by agreement between
drivers and owners, without regard to who bears liability under the
law.
Plainly, however, many drivers are incapable of paying judgments
against them, and customized risk-allocation agreements between
owners and drivers are rarely negotiated because they are costly. The
imposition of vicarious liability on the owners of automobiles thus
raises a number of issues closely related to the issues that arose in the
earlier analysis of the frolic and detour cases, such as the extent of
causation and the cost and effectiveness of incentive devices.
If someone borrows a motor vehicle for personal use and commits
a tort, no obvious relationship to any business enterprise is present
- a fact that might seem to distinguish the frolic and detour cases.
Even so, the concept of enterprise causation remains relevant. For
example, suppose that a tort occurs when a parent sends his child on
an errand for the parent. The tort is then "caused" by the parent's
activities, and the risk of the tort should be taken into account by the
parent in deciding whether to undertake the activity himself or to
send his child to undertake it. The parent's calculus in this respect
is analogous to that of a business, which takes into account the costs
attendant upon its operation in determining the scale at which to
operate.
Alternatively, suppose that the parent lends an automobile to a
child so that the child can run a personal errand of his own. In that
capacity, the parent functions much like an auto rental agency, except
that the child likely does not pay for the use of the vehicle - the
parent's returns are psychic rather than monetary. Just the same, the
costs of the tort are "caused" by the family "business" that provides
the child with an automobile for personal use. Those costs should be
taken into account in determining the scale at which to operate that
"business" - the number of vehicles to purchase and the extent to
which children may use them - and in designing incentives within
the family to encourage the child to drive carefully when parents grant
permission to use a vehicle.
With these observations in mind, consider now the alternative
approaches of various jurisdictions to the liability of motor vehicle
owners for torts committed by a driver who borrows the vehicle.
i. Negligence. - Not surprisingly, all jurisdictions provide a right
of action against negligent automobile owners, even if the driver is
also negligent. Beyond question, such a right of action is efficient.
Whether the owner entrusts an automobile to an incompetent driver,
provides a driver with a negligently maintained vehicle, or fails to
exercise opportunities to dissuade negligent driving while riding as a
passenger, the imposition of liability is appropriate to deter owners
from such careless behavior. Of course, the driver must also be liable
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for his own negligence, and it may often be efficient for owners to
have a right to indemnity from the negligent driver who causes the
tort. 86
Some jurisdictions, however, limit the right of action against the
owner to circumstances in which the owner has been negligent. This
policy is suspect. When drivers are judgment-proof, a variety of
inefficiencies arise if the drivers alone are liable for their torts. Their
inability to pay judgments may reduce their incentive to drive with
care and lead them to undertake activities that require driving even
if the (partially externalized) costs of those activities exceed their
benefits. In addition, insolvent drivers may have little incentive to
purchase liability insurance because a successful plaintiff cannot col-
lect from them, and the efficiency of risk-sharing will suffer.
2. Variations of Strict Vicarious Liability. - Strict vicarious lia-
bility can mitigate the inefficiencies that arise if the owner is held
liable only when negligent. First, it motivates the owner of the vehicle
to employ certain worthwhile incentive devices that might encourage
the driver to exercise care and that might not be required by the due
care standard in a negligence regime. Parents, for example, can con-
dition the continued use of the family automobile by a child upon the
avoidance of accidents. Moreover, as suggested in the analysis of the
frolic and detour cases, any moral hazard attendant upon shifting
liability from the driver to the owner is likely to be modest even if
the owner does not pursue indemnity or employ some other incentive
device to motivate the driver. As noted earlier, the widespread prev-
alence of liability insurance for automobile accidents (usually with
risk-related insurance premiums) suggests that the moral hazard prob-
lem is not unmanageable. Second, the imposition of liability upon the
owner may encourage him to deny use of the automobile when the
activity of driving is not worth the risk. If the owner is a rental
agency, for example, the efficient level of driving activity will result
when the agency charges a rental rate that covers its expected costs
of operation, including its expected liability. If the owner is a parent,
the efficient level of driving activity will result when the parent limits
each child's driving to occasions of sufficient importance to justify the
risk. Third, the imposition of liability on the owner will encourage
the purchase of liability insurance, especially if other drivers are un-
able to pay judgments themselves. Risk will then be shifted to an
efficient risk bearer.
This analysis lends support to the "family purpose doctrine." The
most common application of that doctrine - the imposition of liability
86 See Landes & Posner, supra note i, at 527-28 (arguing that B should have a right of
indemnity against A any time either one acting alone could have avoided an accident but A
could have done so more cheaply than B).
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on parents for torts by their children - arises in situations in which
the tortfeasor is generally quite impecunious.
By contrast, the limitation of strict vicarious liability in some
jurisdictions to circumstances in which the owner is present as a
passenger is more difficult to justify. Vicarious liability in such cases
may well be efficient: the presence of the owner in the vehicle may
provide the owner with an opportunity to dissuade the driver from
negligence, and the occurrence of a tort might indicate that the owner
has negligently failed to do so. Alternatively, perhaps the presence of
the owner suggests that the activity of driving is necessitated by the
owner's personal business, and this causal relation to the owner's
personal activities warrants vicarious liability just as a causal relation
to an employer's business enterprise often warrants vicarious liability
in the frolic and detour cases. Nevertheless, the limitation of vicarious
liability to circumstances in which the owner is present seems ill-
advised. Such a limitation will bar liability in some instances in which
the economic case for vicarious liability is strong, as when a parent
lends an automobile to an impecunious child.
Finally, the consent statutes, the broadest extension of strict vi-
carious liability, are arguably efficient. To be sure, these statutes
increase the transaction costs of the tort system by adding additional
parties to litigation even in cases in which vicarious liability provides
few benefits. Yet if an important benefit of vicarious liability is
improvement in the efficiency of risk-sharing, other transaction costs
may be reduced by the approach of the consent statutes, which allow
plaintiffs to reach the insurance coverage on the injurer's vehicle
without regard to the insurance coverage of the injurer himself - if
the state wishes to ensure a minimum level of insurance coverage to
compensate the injured party in any accident, enforcing compliance
with respect to each registered vehicle may be cheaper than enforcing
compliance by each driver, because the number of drivers considerably
exceeds the number of vehicles. Transaction costs may also be re-
duced by the existence of a bright-line rule of vicarious liability that
avoids the need for litigation over the circumstances in which vicarious
liability provides clear economic benefits. Such efficiencies may indeed
justify the approach of the consent statutes.
B. The Vicarious Liability of Premises Owners
for Torts by Intruders
Increasingly, premises owners incur vicarious liability for inten-
tional torts (usually criminal acts) commited by intruders.8 7 Landlords
87 See generally Brown & Doyle, Growing Liability for Premises Owners, A.B.A..J., Mar.
i, i986, at 64.
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may incur liability for torts against tenants88 and innkeepers may
incur liability for torts against guests.8 9 The liability of premises
owners in these cases usually rests on a negligence theory, a claim
that the premises owner failed to provide adequate security against
intruders. 90 Courts that accept this theory typically hold that the
premises owner owes a duty to take reasonable precautions against a
foreseeable risk of crime. 91 To my knowledge, no court has gone
beyond the negligence approach to impose strict vicarious liability on
premises owners for intentional torts committed by intruders.
These cases differ from the cases previously analyzed because of
the existence of a contractual relationship between the injured party
and the premises owner. The intruder cases also raise a number of
interesting economic questions about the "cause" of the tortious activ-
ity at issue, as well as the social utility of security measures.
Suppose, for example, that a motel chain builds a motel in the
midst of a business district with a low and stable crime rate. Suppose
further that the motel cannot take precautions to reduce the incidence
of crime against guests of the motel. After the motel is built, all
variables that affect the crime rate remain constant, and the crime
rate remains unchanged from the period before the motel was con-
structed. Nonetheless, a few guests of the motel are victimized by
criminal activity for which a remedy lies in tort.
Under the assumed conditions, the motel is plainly not the "cause"
of any crime or tort. The construction of the motel has not affected
the incidence of crime, and it is merely happenstance that guests of
the motel are occasionally victimized - if the motel did not exist,
criminals would simply locate other victims. The costs of crimes
against guests, therefore, are not attributable to the motel and, given
that the motel cannot take precautions, it would be inefficient to
require the motel to bear tort liability for crimes against guests. This
is true for the same reasons that it is generally inefficient to hold
employers liable for torts by employees that are not "caused" by the
employment relationship or whose probability the employer cannot
reduce through incentive devices. Even if the guests' willingness-to-
88 See, e.g., Kline v. i5oo Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 Ill. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979). See generally Annotation,
Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenant Against Criminal Activities of Third Persons, 43
A.L.R.3D 331 (1972).
89 See, e.g., Garzilli v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D.N.Y.
1976); Gray v. Kircher, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1o69, 236 Cal. Rptr. 891, 892-93 (1987). See generally
Annotation, Liability of Hotel or Motel Operator for Injury to Guest Resulting from Assault by
Third Party, 28 A.L.R.4TH 80 (984).
90 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 20, at 442-43.
91 See id. ("A growing number of courts have imposed .. .duties of reasonable protection
upon landlords to protect their tenants, and to protect others perhaps as well, from criminal
attack, provided that such assaults are reasonably foreseeable and preventable.").
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pay rose by the value of the "insurance" provided by the motel chain,
vicarious liability would still be inefficient because it would foster
unnecessary litigation.
Now suppose that the motel can reduce the incidence of crimes
against guests through investment in additional security measures:
dead-bolt locks, patroling watchmen, and the like. Assume further
that the costs of these security measures are less than the associated
reduction in the expected costs of crimes against guests. Hence, motel
guests collectively would be willing to pay the motel operator an
amount in excess of the cost of the security measures. In a world of
perfect information, the operator would undertake such measures vol-
untarily, knowing that he could raise room rates to recoup the cost
without losing customers. Yet guests may not possess the information
necessary to factor the quality of security into their willingness-to-pay
for a room, and thus a market solution may not materialize.
Nonetheless, the law should not necessarily impose a duty on the
proprietor to undertake the security measures. The private value of
security measures (as between the motel and its guests) may consid-
erably exceed their social value. If security measures do not reduce
the incidence of crime but merely redirect criminals to easier targets,
then the added safety of motel guests is offset by reduced safety for
others in the neighborhood. In this case, the optimal contract from
the perspective of the motel and its guests is not socially optimal, and
the security measures are inefficient from a societal perspective. On
the other hand, if security measures deter crime altogether, their
private and social value will converge. The imposition of a duty upon
motel operators to undertake cost-effective security measures may then
be efficient. 92
For yet another variation in the analysis, suppose that a motel is
constructed in a dangerous neighborhood, making its guests natural
targets for crime and increasing the crime rate. An arguAiment could
then be made for strict vicarious liability on the theory that the motel
"caused" the wrongs against its guests; if guests are poorly informed
about security so that no market penalty is exacted for the dangerous
location, the imposition of vicarious liability for crimes that are caused
by the decision to locate in a dangerous neighborhood will help to
provide efficient locational incentives and to discourage the construc-
tion of motels where the resulting crimes against guests may impose
a cost that exceeds the surplus from the services of the motel. To be
sure, some sort of contributory negligence defense would still be nec-
92 Such a duty may be inefficient, however, for another reason. If the market fails to provide
adequate security measures because of poor consumer information, the adoption of legally
mandated security measures may not increase consumer willingness-to-pay. The result may be
a decline in consumption of motel services with a resultant loss of economic surplus that may
partially offset the benefits of the security measures.
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essary to ensure that guests take precautions themselves (such as
locking their rooms).93
In sum, if the existence of the motel creates a special temptation
for criminals or otherwise leads to an increase in the total number of
crimes, then strict vicarious liability might be efficient; otherwise,
motel operators should incur liability only for failure to utilize cost-
effective security measures. This principle raises the question what
measures are "cost effective" and highlights the possible distinction
between the private and social value of security measures. If security
measures have no social value, then a duty to undertake them is
inefficient a fortiori.
As noted earlier, modern case law on premises liability for the
intentional torts of intruders, whether applied to motel operators,
apartment landlords, or other premises owners (except private home-
owners), applies a negligence standard. It imposes a duty on the
premises owner to take reasonable security measures against foresee-
able risks of crime or tort but stops short of strict liability. This
approach is efficient if (i) premises owners do not "cause" intentional
torts by intruders to a substantial degree; (2) premises owners can
nonetheless deter such torts through cost-effective security measures
that protect persons on their premises without simply redirecting the
tortfeasor to an easier mark; and (3) because of information costs or
other transaction costs, the efficient use of security measures will not
result by contract.
The first two assumptions are at least plausible in most premises
liability cases and, as suggested above, the third is also plausible with
respect to cases involving innkeepers. The third assumption is far less
plausible, however, for another important class of premises liability
cases - suits by tenants against their landlords.
The leading case of Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment
Corp.94 is illustrative. A tenant was assaulted and robbed in a com-
mon hallway, presumably (though not certainly) by an intruder. The
victim had been a tenant in the building for approximately seven
years prior to the assault. During that time, a number of security
measures in the building had been discontinued - the desk attendant
in the lobby was no longer present on a regular basis, the building
no longer had a doorman, an entrance to the garage was no longer
guarded regularly, and the rear entrance was no longer kept locked
at all times. The D.C. Circuit, in a 2-I decision, held that the
93 Note that vicarious liability probably would not have much effect on the incentives of
criminals to commit crimes - the motel would have a right to indemnity against any criminal
with significant financial assets, and criminal penalties would still apply to all criminals who
were apprehended.
94 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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defendant-landlord had breached his duty of reasonable care to protect
tenants from assaults by third parties.
Specifically, the majority concluded that a duty to provide security
for the entrances and common areas of the building should be imposed
on the landlord because the landlord had exclusive control over them
and because he had reason to anticipate that assaults would occur
without adequate security. To satisfy that duty, the court held that
the landlord was obliged to maintain the "same relative degree of
security" that was in effect at the time the plaintiff became a tenant
in the building, because she "was led to expect that she could rely
upon this degree of protection." 95
The dissent, among other things, suggested in effect that the court
should not second-guess the market. 96 Its argument was simple -
tenants can select a building and a neighborhood according to their
willingness-to-pay for security, location, and other amenities. The
dissent argued that the court imprudently substituted its judgment
about the appropriate level of security for the collective judgment of
the landlord and the tenants as reflected in their leases and in the
level of security customarily provided by the landlord. 97 Such a sub-
stitution was especially inappropriate, the dissent maintained, when
the tenant of seven years was well-informed about the level of secu-
rity.98
Upon reflection, the argument of the dissent is compelling. As
noted above, the plausible rationale for the imposition of negligence-
based vicarious liability on innkeepers includes an assumption that
their guests are imperfectly informed about the dangers of the neigh-
borhood and the need for security, and perhaps the quality of the
security that innkeepers offer. As a consequence, customers may place
insufficient value on security, and their willingness to pay may not
compensate the innkeeper for instituting efficient security measures.
The incentive to provide them is then lost.
Because the landlord-tenant relation typically extends over a much
longer period of time than the innkeeper-customer relation, however,
tenants can develop information about the need for security in the
neighborhood. Moreover, because most tenants anticipate a stay of
some months or years, it pays for them to invest in the acquisition of
information about the safety of a neighborhood before moving into it.
They are then in a position to assess the value of security measures
in their rental alternatives. Landlords recognize this behavior of ten-
ants and have every incentive to provide security services for which
9s Id. at 486.
96 See id. at 492-93 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
97 See id. at 492.
98 See id.
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prospective tenants are willing to pay through higher rents99 - by
definition, all efficient security measures.10 0
Thus, the trend in the case law toward expanded landlord liability
for assaults by intruders is disquieting.' 0 1 Whatever the merits of
innkeeper liability, the liability of landlords is perhaps best left to the
realm of contract.' 0 2 This conclusion is reinforced by the observation
above that the private value of security measures may exceed their
social value, so that even the security measures required by contract
may be economically excessive. Under these circumstances, it seems
99 A possible objection to this analysis is that landlords can reduce the quality of security in
a rental building, up to a point, without inducing existing tenants to leave. Moving is costly,
and tenants will not move out until the cost imposed upon them by a decline in security exceeds
the cost of finding and moving into another apartment. Thus, it might be argued, landlords
can entice tenants to a building by providing the efficient level of security initially and then
reduce the level of security later without penalty.
This argument presupposes, however, that natural turnover in rental units is low. Setting
aside the complications of rent control, see infra note 103, most landlords must continually fill
vacancies by attracting new tenants. Even if existing tenants are perhaps unlikely to move out
solely in response to a decline in security, the fact that the landlord must fill vacancies that
arise for other reasons provides him with a strong incentive to offer and to maintain adequate
security measures. Cf. Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979) (arguing that a
relatively low percentage of consumers who comparison shop actively can generate efficient
competitive equilibria). There can be no assurance that this process will operate perfectly in all
cases, but neither can a case be made for systematic judicial intervention, especially in light of
the possibility that the level of security that emerges by contract may be economically excessive
due to a divergence of the private and social values of security measures.
100 The analysis of the majority in no way undermines this proposition. To be sure, if
security measures are to be instituted at all with respect to building entrances and common
areas, the landlord must put them in place. Even if such measures are in the interests of the
tenants collectively, no single tenant will purchase them on his own, and collective action to
purchase them is probably too costly. Yet as the analysis in the text suggests, landlords do
have an incentive to supply security measures that cost less than their value to the tenants
(measures that are cost effective from the tenants' perspective) because they can then raise rents
by more than enough to compensate.
As for the suggestion that the plaintiff was led to rely on the security measures in place six
years before the assault, the response of the dissent is a proper one: the decline in security over
time was obvious to the plaintiff, yet she continually renewed her month-to-month tenancy. It
is thus incorrect to suggest, as the majority opinion implied, that the decline in security was
somehow a breach of an implicit contractual obligation.
101 See, e.g., Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975)
(imposing a duty of care on a landlord for an assault by a mental patient of a tenant upon the
employee of another tenant); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972) (holding
that a landlord may be negligent in creating conditions conducive to third-party criminal
activities); see also Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573,
229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986) (en banc) (holding that a condominium association may be liable for
an assault by an intruder upon a unit owner).
102 The role of tort, if any, should be limited to the redress of breaches of "implied contract."
For example, Kline would be a different case if the assault had resulted from a sudden and
unanticipated discontinuation of security services that the landlord had expressly or impliedly
agreed to provide (such as the failure of the doorman to show up for his shift).
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especially ill-advised to impose upon landlords a duty to take greater
precautions against intruders than their contractual obligations re-
quire. 10 3
C. The Vicarious Liability of Employers for Acts of Sexual
Harassment by Employees Against Subordinates or Co-workers
z. Legal Background. - Sexual harassment in the workplace may
constitute a common law intentional tort. Depending upon the nature
of the harassment and the jurisdiction, an action may lie for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful discharge, assault,
battery, invasion of privacy, or interference with contract. 10 4 In any
such tort action, the plaintiff may seek a judgment against the em-
ployer of the offending individual. Common law tests for vicarious
liability will then apply; the plaintiff must normally demonstrate that
the offending individual was a "servant" and that the tort occurred
within the scope of his employment.
Some acts of sexual harassment also constitute discrimination on
the basis of sex in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.105 Thus, instead of a common law tort action, or perhaps in
addition to one, some victims of sexual harassment may file a com-
plaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
If the EEOC fails to resolve the complaint satisfactorily through
conciliation within a specified period, the complainant may bring an
action in federal court.106 In practice, the backlog of cases at the
EEOC virtually ensures that the conciliation period will elapse before
the complaint is resolved, and hence most complainants ultimately
103 This process breaks down in the presence of rent control, which may prevent landlords
from raising the rent to capture the greater willingness-to-pay that results from improved security
and may greatly reduce the natural turnover in rental units that forces landlords to maintain
security in order to attract new tenants. See supra note 99. Indeed, one of my students, who
lived in northwest Washington, D.C. at the time of the Kline decision, conjectures that the
deterioration of security measures at i5oo Massachusetts Ave. may well have followed the
imposition of rent control. I have been unable to confirm or refute this hypothesis.
104 See, e.g., Monge v. Superior Court ex rel. Crown Gibraltar, 176 Cal. App. 3d 503, 5o8,
222 Cal. Rptr. 64, 66 (1986) (recognizing causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, wrongful termination of employment, and breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing between employer and employee); Drinkwalter v. Shipton Supply Co., 732 P.2d
1335, 1338 (Mont. I987) (holding that sexual harassment may constitute a breach of the em-
ployment contract's covenant of good faith and fair dealing and may also give rise to actions
for wrongful discharge on public policy grounds).
105 The Supreme Court held that sexual harassment can violate a person's civil rights under
title VII in Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, io6 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). The Court based its holding
on 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a)(i) (1982), which prohibits employers from discriminating "against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's ... sex. "
106 See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 421-29
(2d ed. 1983).
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have the option to bring suit. The remedies for a successful action
include lost pay and injunctive relief but do not include certain com-
pensatory damages10 7 (such as damages for emotional distress) or
punitive damages.
Victims must sue the "employer," which is defined to include agents
of the employer.' 08 Thus, a critical issue in sexual harassment cases
under title VII, as in cases brought in tort, is the existence of an
agency that would establish employer liability. Indeed, under title
VII, employer liability is an absolute prerequisite to suit.
The Supreme Court addressed the standards for employer liability
in sexual harassment suits under title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.'0 9 In Meritor, the Court distinguished three types of sexual
harassment: (a) "quid pro quo" harassment, whereby supervisory per-
sonnel seek sexual favors in return for promotions, raises, and the
like; (b) "hostile environment" harassment by supervisory personnel,
whereby a supervisor seeks sexual favors from a subordinate without
expressly offering any quid pro quo (the situation in Meritor) and does
so with sufficient frequency or offensiveness that the harassment be-
comes actionable under title VII; and (c) hostile-environment harass-
ment by co-workers, without participation by supervisory person-
nel. 1 0
The Court suggested that a rule of strict vicarious liability will
generally apply to quid pro quo harassment by supervisory personnel.
Such a rule had already been adopted by a number of courts and was
set forth in the EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment."' As to
hostile-environment harassment by supervisory personnel, the Court
declined to set forth a standard for employer liability and instead
suggested that the issue should be resolved case by case through the
application of common law agency principles. 112 By implication, com-
mon law agency principles will also guide cases of hostile-environment
107 See id. at 1452.
105 See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe(b) (1982). Although the law on this point is sketchy, it appears
that the liability of co-defendants (for example, the company and its offending "agent") is joint
and that the court may apportion damages between them as it sees fit. See, e.g., Russell v.
American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. i975) (holding the union and employer jointly
liable), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976). An unsuccessful defendant has no right to contribution
(or, presumably, indemnity) against a party who might have been joined as a defendant in the
original action but was not. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451
U.S. 77 (I98I). At the time of the original action, however, defendants can seek to join other
parties as co-defendants and assert cross-claims against them. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note Io6, at 647-51.
109 io6 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
110 See id. at 2405-08.
M See id. at 2407-08 (citing Brief for United States and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Amicus Curiae at 22, 26, Meritor (No. 84-1979)); 29 CFR § 1604.Ix(c) (x985).
112 See Meritor, io6 S. Ct. at 2408.
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harassment by nonsupervisory personnel, although Meritor was not
directly concerned with such harassment.
Finally, the Court's analysis made clear that the employer's liability
may be predicated on his negligence. Negligence may exist if the
employer fails to adopt a policy against sexual harassment and to
provide an effective grievance procedure for victims of harassment or
has actual knowledge of harassment and fails to take remedial ac-
tion. 113 Lower courts had previously adopted a rule of liability based
on the employer's negligence that typically required actual or construc-
tive knowledge of harassment on the part of the employer in addition
to a failure to take remedial action." 4
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall argued that the appli-
cation of agency principles to hostile-environment harassment by su-
pervisory personnel should almost always lead to a finding of agency
and thus to employer liability."15 Justice Marshall reasoned that ha-
rassment by a supervisor is facilitated by the supervisor's position in
the company hierarchy, whether or not a quid pro quo is offered. He
therefore found no justification for a different standard of employer
liability in these two types of cases.
2. Economic Analysis. - The efficiency of vicarious liability in
sexual harassment cases involves the same economic issues as the
efficiency of vicarious liability in intentional tort cases. What distin-
guishes the harassment cases from many cases involving intentional
torts by employees, however, is the existence once again of a contrac-
tual relationship between the injured party and the employer of the
wrongdoer.
The significance of this contractual relationship is unclear. If po-
tential targets of harassment are fully informed of the risk of harass-
ment prior to accepting employment, employers must compensate
workers subject to a greater risk of harassment with higher wages.
Employers then have an incentive to adopt workplace policies that
reduce the costs of harassment and will do so to the point at which
the reduction in those costs (as measured by the decline in wages of
prospective targets of harassment) is at the margin equal to the costs
of further antiharassment measures. In addition, to the extent that
some harassment remains after the adoption of all cost-effective mea-
sures against it, victims of harassment will be compensated by higher
wages, and the costs of workplace harassment will be borne by the
employer through the wage bill.
Yet the underlying premise of this analysis may be incorrect. In
practice, prospective employees may have little information about the
113 See id. at 2408-09.
114 See, e.g., Tonkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3 d Cir.
1977).
115 See Meritor, io6 S. Ct. at 2409-11 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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probability and seriousness of workplace harassment prior to accepting
employment. Of course, once the costs of harassment become appar-
ent, a victim of harassment can always quit and find a different job,
but the costs of doing so (search costs, forfeit of returns to nontrans-
ferable investments in training, and so on) may outweigh the benefits.
Even if the victim does quit, significant injury to the victim already
may have occurred, and the employer may simply hire another ill-
informed employee at the same wage rate. Hence, it is doubtful that
a market solution to the problem of sexual harassment will emerge
systematically. 116
If a market solution does not materialize, employers will not bear
the costs of harassment "caused" by their business enterprise or adopt
cost-effective policies to discourage harassment, absent the imposition
of civil liability. The analysis can then proceed as if acts of harass-
ment are committed against strangers rather than against individuals
who have a contractual relationship to the employer. In this case,
the principles developed in Part I apply directly.' 7 If the harassment
is "caused" by the employer's enterprise, this fact weighs in favor of
strict vicarious liability. Liability based on negligence is more efficient
if the causal relation between the enterprise and the harassment is
weak but the employer can nonetheless adopt inexpensive, effective
incentive devices to dissuade employees from misconduct. Consider
now the various forms of sexual harassment and their legal treatment
after Meritor.
(a) Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Employees. - A strong
argument can be made that harassment by supervisory employees is
"caused" by the employer's enterprise, whether or not a quid pro quo
is part of the harassment. To be sure, some supervisory employees
would commit acts of harassment irrespective of their position but, as
Justice Marshall suggested in Meritor, sexual harassment by super-
visors is often facilitated by a position of authority." 8 Absent the
116 Contrast this analysis to the analysis of landlord liability for intruders in Kline. See
supra pp. 600-03. The difference there lies in the ability of prospective tenants to obtain
information about the safety of the neighborhood and to observe the quality of security measures
before they move into a rental building. Landlords then have an incentive to provide the
security measures that tenants collectively regard as cost effective, with the expectation that the
cost can be recouped through higher rents. Concomitantly, a failure to provide cost-effective
security measures will lower the willingness-to-pay of prospective tenants by an amount that
exceeds the cost savings to the landlord. A "market solution" to the problem of sexual harassment
is much less likely to emerge, because prospective employees will often have little or no
information about the risks of sexual harassment before they accept a new position.
117 Moreover, in any cases in which information problems are overcome and the market
solution does materialize, nothing is lost, save perhaps the transaction costs of litigation, by
applying the same standard of employer liability to those cases as is applied in other cases -
an implication of the Coase Theorem. See Coase, supra note io.
Is See Meritor, io6 S. Ct. at 2410-11 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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existence of a supervisor-subordinate relationship, the supervisor
would have no leverage over the subordinate, and the likelihood of
sexual harassment would be significantly reduced. Of course, the
causal relation to the enterprise is strongest in quid pro quo cases,
because such harassment cannot occur absent the enterprise hierarchy.
Therefore, the case for strict vicarious liability is strongest for quid
pro quo harassment but may also be quite strong for hostile-environ-
ment harassment by supervisory personnel.
A possible objection to strict vicarious liability is that it might lead
to increased harassment by reducing the incentive for supervisory
employees to behave responsibly. This objection seems unfounded.
To be sure, employers probably cannot observe acts of harassment
very frequently and thus cannot intervene to prevent it. But they can
(and do) promulgate policies under which employees who commit acts
of harassment are discharged or otherwise penalized with regard to
advancement, salary increases, and the like. Such incentives are po-
tentially effective for all employees who value long-term relationships
with their employers." 9
Another possible objection to strict vicarious liability for sexual
harassment by supervisors is that it may lead to meritless lawsuits.
When an employee is fired, for example, the employee may be tempted
to fabricate a sexual harassment claim to save face. Arguably, this is
a serious problem, because sexual harassment suits often turn solely
on an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. As a result, the
chances of success in a meritless lawsuit may be significant.
Yet it is important not to exaggerate this concern. Just as the
difficulties of proof may enhance the chances of success and settlement
value of meritless suits, they also reduce the chances of success in
meritorious suits, especially given that the plaintiff bears the burden
of proof. Moreover, victims of sexual harassment may be reluctant
to file suit or even to report incidents to their employers for fear of
reprisal or a tainted reputation in the labor market. In sum, whatever
incentives exist for meritless suits are substantially counterbalanced
by incentives against meritorious suits, which will reduce the aggre-
gate costs to employers of sexual harassment suits to a level that may
well fall below the true costs of harassment in the workplace.
Thus, assuming that some combination of incentives will enable
the employer to reduce the incidence of sexual harassment (or at least
to avoid a significant increase in harassment), and assuming that the
problem of meritless suits is not a terribly serious one, a strong ar-
gument can be made for strict vicarious liability for acts of harassment
119 Indemnity actions may provide yet another disincentive to harassment, albeit a highly
imperfect one. Indemnity is apparently not available under title VII. See Anderson v. Local
Union No. 3, 582 F. Supp. 627, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). At present, the development of an
indemnity action would be a useful addition to the incentive devices available to the employer.
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against subordinates by supervisory employees. The causal relation
between such acts and the employer's enterprise is probably quite
strong, and the market is unlikely to produce an efficient solution to
the problem of sexual harassment in many cases, notwithstanding the
contractual relationship between the employer and the injured party.
(b) Sexual Harassment by Nonsupervisory Co-Workers. - The
causal relation to the enterprise is clearly weaker in cases of harass-
ment by nonsupervisory co-workers. These co-workers have no lever-
age to exert over the individual who is the object of harassment, and
individuals prone to commit acts of harassment in the absence of any
leverage may well do so irrespective of their occupation, position,
employment, or unemployment. Hence, the probability that they will
engage in harassment may be unaffected, or affected only slightly, by
their employment relationship. Strict vicarious liability for such ha-
rassment will almost certainly be inefficient. Vicarious liability based
on negligence may be efficient, however, if employers are capable of
significantly reducing the incidence of sexual harassment through in-
expensive incentive devices.
Interestingly, as noted earlier, the rule of employer liability applied
by most courts in these cases requires actual or constructive knowledge
of harassment on the part of the employer, coupled with a failure by
the employer to take remedial action. 120 This rule may well be effi-
cient if one supposes that the employer cannot cost effectively diminish
sexual harassment except by announcing a policy against it and taking
disciplinary action under that policy after receiving knowledge of
specific incidents of harassment - a highly plausible assumption.
Thus, more or less consistent with existing law, perhaps the best
rule for cases involving harassment by nonsupervisory co-workers is
to impose a duty on employers to announce policies against sexual
harassment and to provide channels through which victims of harass-
ment can complain to the employer. Once such a policy is in place,
the failure of an employee to report harassment to the employer should
act as a bar to vicarious liability unless the employer can be shown
to have knowledge of the harassment through other channels. The
employer should also escape liability if, despite a report of harassment,
the employer makes a good faith judgment that the report lacks
credibility or is unable to remedy the problem despite reasonable
efforts to do so.
CONCLUSION
This Article has extended the previous economic treatment of vi-
carious liability, which focused on risk-sharing, cost internalization,
120 See supra p. 6o5.
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and incentive maintenance in the employment relationship as the key
economic issues, to incorporate probabilistic notions of causation. The
scope of employment limitation upon respondeat superior liability may
be understood in many instances as a way to limit the employer's
liability to torts that are "caused" by the business enterprise. Yet some
of the rules that have developed to define the scope of employment,
particularly in the frolic and detour cases, are difficult to reconcile
with a view of the tort law as promoting efficiency.
The economic principles developed here are also useful in the study
of vicarious liability outside the employment relationship and outside
the common law of torts. Given certain plausible empirical assump-
tions, many aspects of the law concerning the liability of motor vehicle
owners for torts by another driver, the liability of premises owners
for torts by intruders, and the liability of employers for sexual ha-
rassment by one employee against another may also be understood as
an effort to promote efficiency, although other aspects of the law, such
as the growing liabilty of landlords for-torts by intruders, are harder
to justify on economic grounds.
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